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themselves. The findings also suggest that the generalized findings of party change may 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Question 
The resurgence of regionalism in Europe in the late twentieth century shifted the 
gaze of political science research away from its traditionally state-centric focus to 
supranational and subnational movements (Fitjar 2010; Johnson and Coleman 2012). 
Increasingly, more attention has been paid to ethno-regionalist parties as they form across 
Europe, seeking to alter the balance of power within their respective states. Despite the 
increased focus on ethno-regionalism in political science research, there are still many 
gaps in the literature about them, and there is little discussion of the particularities of 
ethno-regionalist groups in the literature on party change. For example, many factors 
have been identified that cause changes in party demands, but there is little literature 
describing what the nature of that change is. Some studies have also shown that the type 
of party will affect how the party will change as a result of a given stimulus however; 
ethno-regionalist parties are left out of this discussion. The purpose of this study is to fill 
these gaps by analyzing the factors that cause the oscillation of the spatial demands of 
ethno-regionalist parties. This study will also bring into question whether previous 
research on party change has overgeneralized to the point where it does not apply to 
ethno-regionalist parties. Specifically it will focus on the following question: What
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causes ethno-regionalist parties to oscillate between more moderate to more radical 
spatial demands? 
 Regionalist parties, by definition, seek to alter their relationship with the state 
they are subject to (Fitjar 2010; Johnson and Coleman 2012). Therefore, spatial demands, 
demands seeking to alter the territorial relationship between a region with the state, are 
the central axis of regionalist parties. To answer the question of why ethno-regionalist 
parties oscillate between more moderate and more radical spatial demands this study will 
conduct a case study of the Lega Nord (Northern League, LN), a party based in northern 
Italy. Since its inception the Lega has oscillated between what Régis Dandoy describes as 
a federalist party (moderate) and an independentist party (secessionist) (2010). In periods 
when the LN has operated with federalist demands, they attempted to secure more 
autonomy for the regions of the North by campaigning for devolution of the centralized 
powers of the national government to the regions. In periods when they have operated as 
a secessionist party they have campaigned for the secession of several northern regions 
into a single entity known as Padania (Coleman 1996, Richardson and Colombo 2013). 
Little research has been done to examine the factors of why ethno-regionalist parties have 
changed their demands, making this case study an interesting contribution.  
Based on the body of literature on ethno-regionalism and party change, this study 
examines the extent to which several factors, both previously identified and unidentified, 
have are the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. Regarding external factors, the study 
concludes that the LN behaves as a vote seeking party and it will adjust its spatial 
demands according to the positions. The study also finds that the LN adjusts its spatial 
demands based on the position of another party is dependent on the LN’s relationship 
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with the other party. The economic analysis will examine spatial demands first as an 
independent factor and subsequently as a dependent factor. The study finds that there is 
no correlation between the actual state of the Italian economy and the LN’s spatial 
demands. However, when examining the LN’s spatial demands as an independent factor, 
the study concludes that spatial demands affect the ability of the LN to influence the 
Italian economic agenda. Regarding internal factors there are two findings. The first is 
that recent leadership changes have brought about new spatial demands and new 
strategies to attain them. The second is that the high level of concentration of power of 
the LN has made the individual level actions of the leadership an important factor for the 
change in spatial demands. The final findings relate to a factor previously unidentified by 
the literature that can neither be classified as internal or external: the perceived “other”. 
The study does not find evidence to conclude that the “other” is a relevant factor in the 
oscillation of the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. However, when examining the “other” as 
a dependent factor across different periods of the party’s spatial demands, the study 
concludes that the “other” can be used as a justification for these demands. 
Factors of Interest 
The factors of interest in this study encompass both those that have previously 
been identified as significant to party change, and those yet to be identified. By analyzing 
the impact of factors that have been previously identified by the literature on party 
demands the extent to which the factor has an impact can be seen in rich contextual 
detail, and in certain cases give predictive insight on the possible future political strategy 
of the Lega Nord. Previously, these factors have only been applied to party demands in 
general. This study will verify whether or not the generalized theories of party change 
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hold true for ethno-regionalist parties. Therefore, the analysis of these factors will also be 
confirmatory. If the results of the study show the effects of these factors to be 
insignificant, it would suggest that more research should be conducted to assess whether 
or not previous theories have been overgeneralized to include the spatial demands and 
ethno-regionalist parties. 
The analysis of factors that have yet to be identified and found to be significant by 
the literature and their impact on the Lega Nord might warrant further study in a more 
generalized context of ethno-regionalism. Further study of these factors may suggest that 
they have a significant effect on the spatial demands of ethno-regionalist parties, or 
perhaps even demands of political parties in general. However, more than just a single 
case study would need to be conducted to confirm such a generalization. There are four 
types of factors of interest in this study. The two external factors are electoral 
performance and the state of the economy. The internal factor being examined is party 
personalism, the level to which a party is controlled by one leader. The final factor has 
both internal and external components and has yet to be studied in relation to party 
change, the perceived “other”. 
Giovanni Sartori has argued that parties will behave differently according to their 
coalition and blackmail potential (1976). Through this study, I expect to find that in times 
when the Lega Nord has pressed for more moderate spatial demands it is exercising its 
coalition potential with the Parties Forza Italia (Go Italy, FI) and the Allienza Nazionale 
(National Alliance, AN), attempting to realistically obtain political power to actualize 
their policy goals. In periods in which the LN’s spatial demands are more moderate, they 
become a more feasible partner for the center-right coalition. When the Lega Nord has 
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pressed for more radical spatial demands it has been exercising its blackmail potential, 
attempting to remain relevant by taking votes away from established parties. As other 
parties begin to adopt policy stances on issues that had previously been exclusive to the 
LN, the party will begin to lose relevance. The adoption of radical spatial demands sets 
the Lega apart from other parties, reestablishing its relevance as a political entity. 
However, this is done at the expense of being a feasible partner in a governing coalition, 
making it difficult for the LN to realistically achieve its political goals. 
Though the literature has recognized the oscillation in the Lega Nord’s demands, 
there has been little research that has attempted to understand these shifts. There is also 
little research that examines the Lega Nord after the fall of the third Berlusconi 
government, which was the last time the LN has been part of a ruling coalition. This 
study, which will examine the entirety of the Lega’s spatial political demands to present 
day, finds that the Lega has entered a new phase of spatial demands, calling for outright 
secession. Should my hypotheses be supported through this study one could reasonably 
predict that the LN is headed towards another secessionist phase due to electoral losses to 
the Movimento di Cinque Stelle (Five Star Movement, M5S). The examination of the 
factors related to the electoral system may have predictive implications along with 
explanatory implications. 
This study will also examine Italian economic openness in relation to the LN’s 
spatial demands. Previous other scholars have noted that economic factors and economic 
globalization can have an impact on party change (Haupt 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012; 
Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). However, this study finds that the Lega Nord 
behaves as a vote seeking party. Therefore, the actual state of the economy is not as 
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important as the voter’s perception of the economy. The study will confirm the 
hypothesis that there is no correlation with data regarding Italy’s economic openness and 
the LN’s spatial demands. The two may not be unrelated, however. This study will 
examine how the Lega Nord’s spatial demands have either allowed or inhibited the LN 
from influencing the Italian economic agenda. 
Internal factors, those that stem from the party or its structure, can also have an 
impact on the demands of a party (Harmel and Janda 1994). Harmel and Janda identified 
two key internal factors in their analysis of party goals: leadership change, and change in 
dominant factions (1994). Through my analysis of the Lega Nord, I expect to find that 
these factors do not have as great of an impact on their spatial demands as the external 
factors, as for most of the Lega Nord’s history these factorss have remained constant. The 
LN has only had two changes in their leadership, with its founder, Umberto Bossi, 
running the party since its inception in 1984 to 2012, when Roberto Maroni became the 
party leader. Subsequently, in December of 2013, Matteo Salvini defeated Bossi in an 
election for Party Secretary and currently holds the title. The Lega Nord is incredibly 
hierarchical, which has made factions within the party virtually nonexistent (Cento Bull 
and Gilbert 2001). This study finds that under the extreme concentration of power in the 
party leadership, the change in the individual level preferences of Umberto Bossi have 
had an impact on the LN’s spatial demands. The study also finds that the change in party 
leaders has also been a relevant factor for determining the Lega Nord’s spatial demands 
and strategies for achieving these demands. 
It has been theorized that in order for group identity to be established there must 
be some  conception of an “other” which a group can differentiate itself from (Abizadeh 
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2005; Woods 2009; Woods 2010; Johnson and Colman 2012; Richardson and Colombo 
2013). This makes the “other” a part of group identity. Theoretically, a change in a 
group’s conception of the “other” could alter the group’s own identity. Through the case 
of the Lega Nord This study examines whether the party’s spatial demands will oscillate 
with its conception of the ‘other’. The study hypothesizes that in times when the Lega 
Nord campaigns for more radical spatial demands, such as secessionism or autonomy, the 
LN’s conceptualization of the other will be internal, such as the Italian central state or the 
southern regions of Italy. In periods in which the Lega has more moderate spatial 
demands, such as federalism, the ‘other’ they present themselves against will be external, 
such as the European Union or immigrants. Ultimately, this study does not find evidence 
to confirm this hypothesis. Through a qualitative analysis the study does find that the 
“other” has been used to justify the spatial demands of the LN. 
Contributions of the Study 
This study will contribute to the body of knowledge on party demands by 
examining the impacts of previously identified factors in rich contextual detail to assess 
their impacts in a specific scenario. This study will also identify factors that have not yet 
been attributed to changes in party demands by analyzing the impact on the Lega Nord. 
There is a large body of literature on the theory of ‘othering’ and its role in the 
formulation of group and national identity. This study will examine the relationship 
between “othering” and its spatial demands. This study will not only assess the effect of 
‘othering’ on the LN’s ethnic identity, but its spatial demands as well. Although other 
studies have shown internal factors to be important to party demands, few studies have 
examined how the individual level actions of party leaders have caused party change. 
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This study will contribute to the literature on ethno-regionalist parties by demonstrating 
how changes at the individual level of party leadership can have an impact on spatial 
demands. From a purely comparative perspective, this study contributes to our 
knowledge of the dynamics of self-determination and secessionist struggles. 
Applying previously identified factors, such as electoral support, to the case of the 
Lega Nord also gives the study some predictive power. If the hypotheses of this study are 
found to be true, then another oscillation towards more radical spatial demands can be 
expected, as new parties enter into the Italian political arena. One of these parties is 
beginning to take ownership of the anti-politics issue away from the LN. This could 
potentially cause the Lega Nord to oscillate toward secessionism once again to remain 
relevant. Although literature on coalition and blackmail potential on party demands is 
extensive, examining this factor in the case of the LN could contribute some predictive 
insight for researchers in the field of Italian politics. 
The examination of the factor of economic openness will yield an understanding 
of how the LN behaves as a vote seeking party. The findings refute previous theories 
suggesting that parties are responsive to economic factors. This suggests that these 
theories may have overgeneralized their findings to include ethno-regionalist parties. In 
order to assess the relationship between economics and spatial demands the study then 
examines the LN’s spatial demands as the independent factor, and the success of their 
economic policies as the dependent factor. The study finds that when the LN has had 
more moderate spatial demands it has been better able to influence the Italian economic 
agenda. 
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Although previous studies have acknowledged the significance of internal factors 
in their relation to spatial change, the literature has largely ignored actions taken at the 
individual level by the party’s leader. Through the examination of Umberto Bossi’s 
choices as party leader, this study concludes that the actions of party leaders can impact 
their spatial demands. Through an analysis of the leadership of Matteo Salvini, the 
current party leader, this study confirms that change in party leadership can also be a 
relevant factor regarding changes in spatial demands. 
Previous studies on party change have ignored the effect of “othering” on the 
oscillation of spatial demands. This study does not find sufficient evidence to suggest that 
“othering” is correlated with a change in spatial demands. Although that result was null, 
there is a relationship found between spatial demands and “othering”. When examining 
the “other as the dependent factor across different periods of the Lega Nord’s spatial 
demands the study finds that the “other” has been used as a justification for these 
demands.  
Merits and Limitations 
The Lega Nord is an ideal case to examine the impact of these factors on the 
oscillation of spatial demands in ethno-regionalist parties because few ethno-regionalist 
parties have the longevity or scale of national representation as the LN. The LN also has 
a weak claim to ethnic identity as Northern Italy has never been a politically or culturally 
united entity (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Paasi 2009; Cento Bull 2011; Massetti, and 
Toubeau 2013). Without a solid identity the party’s ideology and demands have been 
unsound and easily subject to fluctuations by other factors (Koff and Koff 2000; 
Giordano 2004). Therefore, the Lega Nord is an ideal case to examine because there are 
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three decades worth of changes in spatial demands to be examined, and its support base is 
large enough to examine these changes at a national level. 
The case study method provides rich contextual detail for the specific case of the 
Lega Nord. Through examining a specific case in detail, not only can the significance of 
factors be assessed, but the magnitude of their impact under context specific cases can be 
assessed as well.  
This study does not come without its limitations, however. Although the case 
study method gives rich contextual detail to a specific case, it does so at the expense of 
external validity (Lijphart 1971; Collier 1993). The analysis in this study is tailored for 
the Lega Nord and the Italian political context. It is not a systematic study of 
commonalities across a multitude of ethno-regionalist parties. Therefore, the findings of 
this study may not necessarily be generalizable to every case of ethno-regionalism. 
Generalizations of this study made outside the context of economically developed, 
parliamentary, European Union (EU) member-states may be misplaced. Even 
generalizations made in the context of EU members should not be made to hastily, as 
some of the political conditions being discussed may only exist in Italy. 
The case study method does not have adequate external validity to make broad 
generalizations about ethno-regionalist parties. However, case studies are ideal starting 
points for future research, as they provide the contextual detail that can prove useful in 
generating hypotheses and building theories (Sartori 1991). Although the case study 
method may be narrow grounds for making generalizations, the phenomenon of ethno-
regionalism is so widespread across Europe that this study may still have implications in 
regions, such as Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque region. If the findings of this study 
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can be applied to other ethno-regionalist parties in nearby states with many of the same 
political conditions as Italy, then this study could serve as a starting point for more 
generalizable theories on European ethno-regionalism. As more research is conducted in 
other regions across the globe perhaps theories may converge upon more generalized 
theories. For what this study lacks in external validity it will make up for with detail 
which will yeild a rich understanding of a specific case, and could also serve as a starting 
point for more generalizable research as more data is collected. 
Overview of the Chapters 
Chapter II will review the relevant literature. It will discuss the state of the body 
of knowledge on both changes in party demands, and ethno-regionalism. This chapter 
will provide an overview of consensuses, disagreements, and knowledge gaps that are 
existent in the literature. This chapter will demonstrate the place that the study will take 
in a larger body of knowledge. 
Chapter III will be the history and context of the Lega Nord in the Italian political 
system.  It will begin with the Lega’s inception in 1984 and span until 2014. This chapter 
will provide the necessary background knowledge for the analysis of the factors by 
explaining how the Lega Nord’s policy stances have changed throughout its existence, 
and identifying the LN’s political adversaries and allies. The chapter will provide rich 
contextual detail for the case study that will be conducted in the following chapters. 
Chapter IV will present the theoretical framework of the study. This chapter will 
address the knowledge gaps in the literature. Past studies will be drawn upon to formulate 
hypotheses about the spatial demands of ethno-regionalist parties. 
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Chapter V will focus on the methodology of the study. This chapter will discuss 
the strengths and weaknesses of the case study method. It will also discuss the 
appropriateness of the case study method for the research question, and the 
appropriateness of the Lega Nord as the case study. This will be followed by an in-depth 
explanation of the analysis methods that will be used in chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX. 
Finally the section will conclude with the establishment of hypotheses in relation to the 
Lega Nord, based upon the theoretical framework. 
Chapter VI will analyze the effect of the factor of electoral support has had on the 
Lega Nord’s Spatial demands. Specifically, this factor will be looked at through the 
theoretical framework of coalition and blackmail potential. In this chapter, the Lega 
Nord’s spatial demands will be analyzed alongside their spatial demands. The feasibility 
of possible governing coalitions will also be assessing by examining the Lega Nord’s 
policy positions versus that of potential coalition partners. Electoral strategies will also be 
connected with the uniqueness of the Lega Nord’s platform. 
Chapter VII will focus on the performance related factor of economic success. 
This chapter will analyze the Lega Nord’s policy position in relation to the ability of the 
LN to deliver on the economic success they posit that their policy platform will create. 
The chapter will examine economic data in relation to the Lega Nord’s position in 
government, and their spatial demands. This chapter will assess the extent to which the 
LN’s ideology concerning spatial demands was malleable versus their potential for more 
success in government if they were to take a more moderate stance. 
Chapter VIII will examine the impact internal factors have had on the LN’s 
spatial demands. Several of the previously identified internal factors that have been 
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shown to cause oscillation in the demands of political parties, such as change in dominant 
factions or change in leadership, were absent until recent developments occurred. 
Therefore, this chapter will examine the personality and organizational traits of Umberto 
Bossi, the former leader of the LN to assess how he kept tight control over party policy, 
and how he brokered negotiations inside the governing coalitions he was a member of. 
This chapter will also compare Umberto Bossi to Matteo Salvini, the current leader of the 
Lega Nord. 
Chapter IX will analyze the impact that ‘othering’ has had on the Lega Nord’s 
demands. This chapter will assess how the Lega’s spatial demands have changed between 
federalism and secession with the LN’s conception of the ‘other’, which has changed 
between internal and external ‘others’. The chapter will demonstrate how the Lega’s 
policy stances and visual propaganda have changed over time, and conclude with an 
assessment of the results versus the hypotheses. 
Chapter X will be a conclusion of the study and its findings. This chapter will 
present an overview of the findings of the analysis chapters, and place them in the context 
of the body of literature on ethno-regionalist parties and party demands. In this chapter 
predictions on the possible future political strategies of the Lega Nord will be presented 
based upon the findings. This chapter will also suggest future research topics based on 
the findings of this study. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will summarize the existing literature on the demands of ethno-
regionalist parties. It will begin by focusing on the literature regarding the demands of 
political parties. The following section will identify the knowledge gaps in the literature 
on party demands, and put the research question into context. The subsequent section will 
discuss the historical rise of regionalism in Europe during the end of the twentieth 
century, as well as the renewed focus on regionalism, and units of analysis besides the 
state by political scientists. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of ethno-
regionalism and the difficulty scholars have had agreeing on a solid definition, and gaps 
in the ethno-regionalist literature. 
 Party Demands  
Angelo Panebianco (1988) asserted that parties do not change their policies 
arbitrarily. They need some sort of stimulus to motivate change. Change can come at a 
high cost of human and material resources; therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
parties will resist change, and change will only be made under pressure created by some 
sort of stimulus (Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda 1995). Though 
many theories have been posited in the literature concerning changes in party demands
14 
 
and goals, there seems to be a general consensus on two broad categories of variables. 
Changes in demands and goals occur as a result of external stimuli, and the internal 
structure of the party (Harmel and Janda 1994; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013).  
External variables are factors outside of party control that the party must adapt to. 
These can include changes to the party system and electoral results (Harmel and Janda 
1994). The literature has found that political parties will respond to external stimuli, and 
in some cases these stimuli are powerful enough to force a party to reevaluate its goals 
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013).  
Internal structural variables pertain to the party organization. These can include 
leadership changes, factionalism within the party, and the balance of power between the 
party leadership and its activists (Harmel and Janda 1994; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 
2013). There is an interaction between the internal and external forces, and this 
interaction will ultimately determine whether a party’s goals will remain static or change 
(Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). 
External Variables 
Election results have been identified as a powerful motivating factor for change in 
party positions, as the goal of most parties is to maximize their share of the electorate 
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012; Schumacher, de 
Vries, and Vis 2013). Harmel and Janda’s theory of party change (1994) proposed 
electoral failure increases the likelihood of the party change for vote seeking parties. This 
proposition was later empirically tested utilizing data from the first postwar election to 
1998 of the 23 OECD countries. According to this study, conducted by Zeynep Somer-
Topcu, parties must balance the potential electoral gain with the potential risk associated 
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with party change. Parties will use election results as a source of information on public 
opinion, and are more prone to switching their positions as a result of electoral losses 
than electoral gains. This effect diminishes as time passes from the election (2009). 
Larger electoral losses will cause those with control over party policy to be more open to 
taking the risk associated with a change in policy (2009). Electoral support is key to a 
party’s survival and one of the most extensively studied external variables in relation to 
changing party policy. 
Another external variable that has been identified by the literature is the political 
positions of other parties. It is possible that a party may change its goals to better fit in 
with the norms of the system, possibly resulting in greater acceptance for the party or 
even increasing their coalition potential (Harmel and Janda 1994). Political parties can 
influence the policy agendas of other parties, even while in opposition to the governing 
coalition, through their blackmail potential. Blackmail potential is a concept theorized by 
Giovanni Sartori (1976), stating that parties could still remain relevant while in the 
opposition to the governing coalition, so long as they can direct the tactics and policy 
agenda of the other political parties. One method parties can use to alter other the policy 
positions of other parties is to coerce them through electoral losses (Evans 2002; 
Massetti, and Toubeau 2013). For example, the Green Party exercised its blackmail 
potential in the United States in the 2000 presidential election when it attracted voters 
from the Democratic Party’s base, causing future Democratic candidates to take 
environmental issues more seriously. Frequently, this tactic is utilized by anti-system 
parties (Sartori 1976). 
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The effect of the positions of rival parties on party change was empirically tested 
in a study conducted by James Adams and Zeynep Sommer-Topcu (2009). Using data 
from the Comparative Manifesto Project they found that political parties were indeed 
responsive to policy shifts of rival parties. Their “Party Dynamics Hypothesis” found that 
parties tend to move their policies in the same direction as their rival parties. Their 
“Ideological Families Hypothesis” found that parties were more sensitive to shifts in 
parties that are ideologically similar to them (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). This 
variable is an example of how the party system itself can have an effect on whether a 
party will or will not change its demands. 
Although several studies have shown the aforementioned variables to have 
significant impacts on the shift in party goals, this does not necessarily mean that all 
political parties behave the same. Each political party is unique, and some may have 
different responses to the same stimuli. Certain stimuli may be considered a political 
shock for one party, while only a minor adjustment for another (Harmel and Janda 1994). 
Some studies have shown that certain categories of parties will react differently to the 
same stimulus. For example, a study by Lawrence Ezrow and his colleagues suggests that 
certain types of parties will be more responsive to different parts of the electorate. 
Mainstream parties seem to be responsive to changes in the mean voter, but less 
responsive to changes in their mean supporters. However, niche parties seem to respond 
to changes in their mean supporters, but less responsive to changes in the mean voter 
(Ezrow, De Vries, Steenbergen, and Edwards 2011). Another study showed that niche 
parties infrequently responded to the changes of the general electorate because they had 
little incentive to do so, as they were frequently punished at the polls when moderating 
17 
 
their position (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow 2006).  Several grand theories have 
been made about change in party policy, but as Ezrow and his colleagues have shown 
there are many nuances that have yet to be explored that relate to the parties themselves. 
External variables are not only found within the state, but can be international as 
well. Another variable that scholars have posited has affected party policy change is the 
economic conditions, financial actors, and institutions that the party is subject to (Haupt 
2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). The economic 
forces of the market could in some cases be at odds with the interests of the voters the 
party is elected to represent (Haupt 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). The party’s policy 
agenda could also be at odds with global economic forces, which could cause the party to 
abandon said policies (Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). This was the case with the French 
Socialist party in the 1980’s which abandoned their initial socialist program for an 
economic program more in line with the neoliberal world order (Ezrow and Hellwig 
2012). Economic elites also wield a considerable amount of political power, making them 
difficult for a party to ignore. Economic elites are political actors which compete with the 
electorate for the attention of political parties (Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). 
The level of globalization is another external variable to consider when analyzing 
shifts in party policy. This variable is not entirely separate from the variable of economic 
influences, as economies are increasingly becoming globalized, and political parties have 
been shown to be responsive to globalized economic shifts (Haupt 2010). The world 
economy is increasingly becoming more integrated, resulting in political parties 
becoming more dependent on “market elites” for specialized information relating to these 
new global forces (Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). Ezrow and Hellwig (2012), using empirical 
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data from the Comparative Manifesto Project, found that markets that were more exposed 
to the global economy were less responsive to median voter shifts. Research conducted 
by Haupt (2010) found that although parties were sensitive to globalized economic shifts, 
they are sensitive in different ways depending on their level of economic openness. This 
would suggest that more research needs to be conducted to discover how and why 
different parties elicit different responses from the same stimuli. 
Internal Variables 
Scholars have previously suggested that external performance related variables 
are informative, but are not enough to completely explain party change (Harmel and 
Janda 1994; Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda 1995). Variables that pertain to the party’s 
organization itself can also have an impact on whether or not a party will change its goals 
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda 1995; Schumacher, de Vries, and 
Vis 2013).  
One such internal variable is the level of factionalism within the party and the 
factions that are dominant. In Harmel and Janda’s (1994) “An Integrated Theory of Party 
Goals and Party Change” the goals of parties are likely to change when there is a change 
in the composition of the dominant faction. Also according to this theory, as the change 
in the composition of the dominant party increases the likelihood of party change 
increases as well. It is quite common for political parties to be composed of factions, 
which can arise from competition of demands within the party (Harmel and Janda 1994; 
Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda 1995). Harmel and Janda’s theory was later empirically 
tested by Harmel, Heo, Tan and Janda (1995) utilizing data from several parties from 
Germany and the UK over the period of 1950-1990. Although Harmel found that poor 
19 
 
electoral performance was a necessary condition for party change, he found that it was 
not sufficient to explain the entirety of party change. One discovery of his study was the 
positive correlation between change in the dominant party faction and party change. The 
dominant faction will implement any changes in party policy (Harmel and Janda 1995). 
Therefore, when a new faction comes to dominate the party, it is likely that they will have 
different demands from the previous dominant faction. 
Following a similar logic, several sources have identified leadership change as 
another internal variable that can effect change in a party’s goals (Harmel and Janda 
1994; Harmel 1995). Leadership change was another variable theorized by Harmel and 
Janda in 1994 and later confirmed in Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda’s (1995) study about 
why political parties change their goals. An illustrative case of the power of leadership 
change within a party is the Chinese Communist Party, where the party has consolidated 
its control over the government for decades. However, China has had several leaders with 
different leadership approaches, which resulted in deep structural reforms (Breslin 2008; 
Brødsgaard and Grünberg 2013). Although the change in a dominant faction in a political 
party will result in a change of leadership, a change in leadership does not necessarily 
imply that there will be a change in the dominant party faction (Harmel and Janda 1994). 
Therefore, change in leadership is a variable that should be examined separately from 
change in the dominant party faction. 
Recently, another variable related to party organization has been under 
examination. A study examining 55 political parties in Europe over a time period from 
1977 to 2003 found that the organization of power within a party was correlated with its 
responsiveness to voters (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). Two categories of power 
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organization were defined: leadership dominated parties and activist dominated parties. 
Leadership dominated parties were defined as parties in which power was concentrated 
among a few elites, and there were few internal veto players. Activist dominated parties 
were defined as parties in which power is diffused among many members of the party 
and party organizations (Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). The study found that the 
leadership dominated parties were more responsive to changes in the median voter, while 
activist dominated parties were more responsive to changes in voters within the party 
(Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). Leadership dominated parties are also more prone 
to office exclusion (Aldrich 1995; Katz and Mair 1994). This variable has only recently 
found to be a relevant factor. Therefore, it warrants further study, as to understand if 
power distribution in a party has effects beyond what has already been studied. 
Internal and External Variables Working Together 
The body of literature concerning party change had previously acknowledged the 
external variables as the primary forces behind party change. Later it became commonly 
accepted that external factors were not enough on their own to account for these changes, 
but the internal variables related to party organization also played a role. Recently, some 
scholars of party change have concluded that the internal and the external variables 
cannot be entirely separated from each other. The internal and the external variables play 
different vital roles in the process of party change and can affect one another. 
In order for a political party to change there must be some sort of internal 
reorganization that must occur; however, external variables could be the reason that these 
internal changes become necessary, relating both the internal and the external variables 
(Harmel and Janda 1994; Panebianco 1988). Therefore, since some sort of internal 
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reorganization is a necessary precondition for party change, it is possible that some party 
changes could be explained solely by internal variables, but impossible that party change 
could be caused solely by external factors (Harmel and Janda 1994). External variables 
may act as stimuli for a response from the party, but ultimately it is the internal variables 
that will determine the response. According to Harmel and Janda, “[T]he most potent 
external stimuli are those which cause a party to reevaluate its effectiveness in meeting its 
primary goal, whether it be electoral success or something else. These externally induced 
‘shocks’ to the party’s internal system can catalyze a process of change that reaches more 
broadly and cuts more deeply than can occur as the result of internal changes…alone” 
(1994). 
Party Change: Gaps in Knowledge 
Despite the extensive body of literature on party change there are still many gaps 
in the scholarly understanding of the issue. Many variables have been identified that have 
elicited responses from political parties, causing their policies to shift. However, there are 
relatively few studies (Haupt 2010; Ezrow, De Vries, Steenbergen, and Edwards 2011; 
Ezrow and Hellwig 2012; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013) that have attempted to 
explain the nature of these shifts. Recent studies have suggested that party ideology, level 
of appeal, and distribution of power all will affect how a party will respond to a certain 
stimulus (Ezrow, De Vries, Steenbergen, and Edwards 2011; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012; 
Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). Recently, it has become increasingly evident that 
there is much more to be explored on the topic of party change beyond the grand 
generalizations. The type of party and its organization has an effect on how parties will 
respond to variables associated with party change. One category of political party that has 
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been noticeably absent from this discussion is ethno-regionalist parties. This study will 
attempt to explore the nuances of ethno-regionalist party change by examining their 
central issue, spatial demands. 
Another observable knowledge gap in the literature is that many of the relevant 
variables, not only affect party policy change, but affect each other. It has been theorized 
that external stimuli can act as a catalyst for party change, though ultimately change will 
occur as a result of the internal variables (Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994). 
Little research has been done to explain what types of effects these variables have on 
each other. This study will contribute to this discussion by exploring how leadership 
structure and concentration of power within a party can impact other internal variables, 
and thus the party’s response to external variables. 
Resurgence of Regionalism 
Due to the nascent nature of European regionalism, it is a body of research with 
many identifiable gaps. In the twentieth century, the height of nationalism, much of the 
research in political science had a state-centric focus, giving an incomplete account of the 
complexity of politics at the subnational level (Agnew 2002; Fitjar 2010). However, as 
the twentieth century drew to a close, it became apparent, especially in Europe, that the 
nation-state was not the sole source of identity, and increasingly regional identity was 
becoming politicized, seeking to redefine regional relationships with the state, and 
causing more academic interest in the study of subnational regions (Fitjar 2010; Johnson 
and Coleman 2012). Recently, there has been a greater focus on regions as economic 
units. One reason for this is the exacerbation of interregional disparities as a result of 
economic globalization (Giordano 2001; Johnson and Coleman 2012). 
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Elements of regionalism, such as economic protectionism, were evident in the 
early 20
th
 century until the 1930s (Paasi 2009). However, after the overt nationalism of 
World War II, much of the focus returned to the state (Agnew 2002; Fitjar 2010). 
European regionalism resurged again in the 1990s, and was labeled ‘new regionalism’ by 
scholars to distinguish it from the ‘old regionalism’ from the pre-World War II era (Paasi 
2009). The challenge to state-centrism is an essential element of regionalist ideology 
(Paasi 2009; Fitjar 2010). Globalization has created suprastate regionalism, the idea that 
the state is too small to effectively function in the global capitalist economy (Paasi 2009; 
Fitjar 2010). Globalization also caused the resurgence of sub-state regionalism, in which 
the state is perceived as too cumbersome to be conducive to cultural identification and 
democracy (Paasi 2009; Fitjar 2010). Both suprastate and sub-state regionalist 
movements attempt to increase their own power versus the centralized power of the state 
(Paasi 2009; Fitjar 2010). 
Several scholars have attempted to define regionalism. Although these definitions 
vary, they seem to converge on regionalism as the idea of a territory that attempts to alter 
its relationship with the state(s) under which they are subject to authority (Dandoy 2010; 
Fitjar 2010; Massetti and Schakle 2013). Regionalism can be characterized as 
reactionary, stemming from the desire to defend a region against cultural, ethnic, and 
economic homogenizing forces (Dandoy 2010; Fitjar 2010; Gould and Messina 2013). 
Regional identity can arise from cultural, ethnic, or economic differences that the region 
perceives differentiates it from the state (Agnew 2002; Dandoy 2010; Fitjar 2010; Woods 
2009; Woods 2010; Johnson and Coleman 2013). Regionalist parties can be agents of 
change in the structure of the central government even when they are not represented on 
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the national level, which occurs frequently as a result of the particularity of regionalist 
interests (Massetti and Schakle 2013; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). 
Ethno-Regionalism 
Ethno-regionalism, though previously understudied, recently has come to the 
forefront of research on regionalism, as more ethno-regionalist parties are having an 
impact on the national stage, especially in Europe (Strmiska 2002). There is considerable 
debate on what constitutes an ethno-regionalist party. Some scholars consider all 
subnational forms of regionalism ethno-regionalist, while others argue that ethnic 
components are not a necessary component of subnational regionalism, making ethno-
regionalism a specific case of subnational regionalism (Dandoy 2010). However, there is 
a broad agreement among two elements of ethno-regionalism that can be used to 
construct a definition. Ethno-regionalist movements are subnational, have exclusive 
group identity, and some sort of territorial claim corresponding to its exclusive identity 
that it desires to renegotiate with the state (Türsan 1998; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; 
Strmiska2002; Dandoy 2009; Dandoy 2010). 
Part of the difficulty in assessing what qualifies as an ethno-regionalist party is 
the question of what constitutes an ethnicity (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001).To what 
extent does the movement need to have a solid exclusive group identity, and does this 
group identity need to be grounded in reality? Theoretically, not all regionalist 
movements are ethno-regionalist movements (Strmiska 2002). Several scholars have 
noted that in certain cases ethno-regionalist movements have manufactured their identity 
(Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi 2006; Cento Bull 2009; Woods 2009; Cento 
Bull 2011; Woods 2011). In these cases the historical narrative presented to justify the 
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movement’s claim to ethnic unity may not be historically accurate or even be logical. If 
not all regionalist movements are considered ethno-regionalist, are those movements with 
a “manufactured” ethnic identity to be included?  
Even if ethno-regionalism does not include all subnational regional movements 
there is a wide consensus that ethnicity, even those with long histories, are rooted in 
imagined communities (Agnew 2001; Fitjar 2010). If ethnic communities are imagined in 
all cases, then even the movements that have manufactured their ethnic identities, even 
those which the historical record will not validate should be considered ethno-regionalist 
as well, so long as they have convinced others around them that they are indeed 
ethnically unique and have some sort of territorial claim. Ethnicities are as real to the 
extent that people can be convinced they are real. 
Previous attempts to classify ethno-regionalist parties have focused too 
specifically on the peculiarities of parties; however, Regis Dandoy offers a coherent 
model of classification, by creating three broad categories based on the severity of the 
party’s demands (2010). The desire for spatial rearrangement, the rearrangement of the 
distribution of power with between the state and a specific territorial entity, is 
characteristic of all regionalist parties (Strmiska2002; Paasi 2009; Fitjar 2010). Rather 
than creating several subcategories of ethno-regionalist parties based on various 
peculiarities, Dandoy’s (2010) typology is all encompassing by revolving around the 
spatial demands, the demands for spatial rearrangement, of ethno-regionalist movements. 
These demands are characteristic of all ethno-regionalist parties.  
The least radical parties in Dandoy’s (2010) typology are the protectionist parties. 
Protectionists seek official recognition from the state, generally based on cultural or 
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linguistic grounds, and an improvement of their situation (2010). The moderately radical 
category of ethno-regionalist organizations are decentralist parties. Decentralists make 
the demands of the protectionist parties, as well as challenge the division of authority 
between the state and the region, generally through a federalist or autonomist framework 
(2010). The final, and most radical, category is the secessionist parties. Secessionists 
demand complete detachment from the state(s) in which they are currently subjected to 
the authority of. This could theoretically occur in the form of complete detachment from 
one or many states into an independent state, or reattachment to another state which the 
ethnic movement has ties to (2010). 
Ethno-Regionalist Parties: Knowledge Gaps 
With such stark distinctions between Dandoy’s categories it can be difficult to 
place certain ethno-regionalist parties solidly in one group. Since party demands are 
seldom static the issue could be further complicated if a party’s spatial demands were to 
change. One of the major gaps that Dandoy identifies in his conclusion is the causes that 
would make a party oscillate between demands (2010). When examining the literature on 
party demands in general there is little discussion of ethno-regionalism or spatial 
demands. This study will address the question of why ethno-regionalist parties will 
change their spatial demands, the demands that the party’s identity revolves around. 
27 
 
CHAPTER III 
THE LEGA NORD: HISTORY AND CONTEXT 
 
From Inception to the Fall of Berlusconi I (1984-1995) 
The Lega Nord
1
 was formed in 1984 as a federation of smaller leagues 
representing the interests and seeking the autonomous status of individual regions in 
Northern Italy. This early alliance of regional leagues stressed the cultural and economic 
differences between the North and the South of Italy, and were largely disorganized and 
loosely centered around the Lega Lombardia (the Lombard League) and their leader, 
Umberto Bossi (Koff and Koff 2000; Giordano 2001; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Cento 
Bull 2011; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The party’s leadership is highly personalistic 
revolving around its founder, and the founder of the Lega Lombardia, Umberto Bossi, a 
charismatic, controversial, and in some cases unpredictable figure in Italian politics 
(Gilbert 1993; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Koff and Koff 2000; Giordano 2004; Woods 
2010). He has been able to assert tight control over the LN allowing no room for dissent 
amongst its ranks (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). Bossi’s persona revolves around his 
energetic and captivating speech, his working class background, and his utilization of 
symbolism (Gilbert 1993). He personally had a role in developing the LN’s logo, Il 
Giuramento di Pontidia (The Oath of Pontida), which is a figure of a warrior holding his 
sword upward, harkening to a 12
th
 Century victory of the Lombards defending Northern 
                                                          
1
 Henceforth LN 
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Italy from the Holy Roman Empire (Gilbert 1993).  The party being structured 
predominantly around one leader is what has made the party’s ideological identity weak 
and its policy positions frequently subject to change (Koff and Koff 2000; Giordano 
2004). 
The Lega Lombardia immediately experienced electoral success, gaining 
representation on the provincial assembly in 1985 and winning a Senate seat (given to 
Umberto Bossi) and sending one representative to the Chamber of Deputies in the Italian 
general elections of 1987 (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). After experiencing success in 
the European Parliamentary elections of 1989 by forming a ‘Northern Alliance’, Bossi 
announced at the Party’s national congress the formation of a federation of Northern 
autonomist parties that would be known as the Lega Nord (Cento Bull 2001; Richardson 
and Colombo 2013). Realizing the difficulty of mobilizing popular support through the 
individual leagues, it was at this point the LN increasingly emphasized Northern ethno-
regionalism as a whole (Cento Bull 2011). The Lega continued to fare well in the 
regional elections of 1990, and it was shortly after this victory that the party began to 
consolidate more as a coherent political party (Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and 
Gilbert 2001; Cento Bull 2011). In 1992, less than a decade since the formation of the 
Lega Lombardia, the LN established itself as a major political force on the national stage 
in the Italian general election, the final election of the First Republic, taking 8.2% of the 
national vote and sending 55 representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and 25 Senators 
to the Senate (Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and Gilbert; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). 
It is logical that the Lega Nord would gain prominence at this point in history. 
Corruption was rampant in the Italian government, and globalization had brought changes 
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that were unwelcome for many. The Lega Nord’s platform addressed these issues. The 
LN’s support base and structure shows strong populist elements, with a strong emphasis 
on local organizations and ties with local businesses, strong opposition and distrust of the 
central government, and grassroots organization (Koff and Koff 2000; Giordano 2001; 
Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2004; Woods 2009; Woods 2010; Cento Bull 
2011; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). Much of their electorate were young working class 
people living in the Northern industrial alpine regions of Italy (Koff and Koff 2000; 
Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2001). With this organizational structure and 
support base the Lega Nord was able to capitalize off of popular distrust of the Italian 
government’s incompetence, corruption, inefficacy, and taxation rates that did not match 
the quality of public services (Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; 
Giordano 2004). It was the engaging organizational structure of the LN, along with the 
ability of the party to address the people’s fears of the Italian political system that 
allowed them to erode away the political culture of Christian Democrats (DC), which 
until then had been the dominant political party of the North (Giordano 2004; Cento Bull 
2011; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The mass distrust of the political system would not 
only cause the rapid expansion of the LN, it would eventually dismantle the Italian party 
system. 
Since the foundation of the first Republic in 1948 the DC had been a part of every 
governing coalition (Waters 1994; Koff and Koff 2000). The party system of the First 
Republic insured that the DC would retain this dominance (Waters 1994). Its only major 
opposition was the Communist Party (PCI), the largest and most established Communist 
party in Western Europe, and the DC was able to successfully present itself as the only 
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democratic option (Waters 1994; Koff and Koff 2000). The fall of Communism and the 
dissolution of the PCI in 1991, led to public questioning of the loosely organized and 
highly corrupt DC (Waters 1994). The culmination of the distrust in the Italian political 
system manifested itself in the Tangentopoli (kickback city) crisis of 1992, in which the 
judiciary led investigations regarding corruption on thousands of suspects, including 
some of the highest ranking politicians and business elites (Waters 1994; Koff and Koff 
2000). The Lega Nord was able to capitalize off the Tangentopoli crisis because it gave 
more legitimacy to their anti-state arguments and their portrayal of the Italian political 
class as corrupt Mafiosi (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Massetti and Taubeau 2013). 
The Tangentopoli crisis allowed for rapid passage of electoral reform in 1993, and 
also led to the dissolution of the party system that had maintained DC dominance since 
1948, thus ushering in the Second Republic (Waters 1994; Koff and Koff 2000). In the 
1993 local elections it became apparent in the North that the LN, formed less than a 
decade ago and thought to be a fringe party that would disappear, was of equal strength to 
that of the DC (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). In 1994 a new electoral challenge was 
posed to the Lega Nord by the newly formed center-right party of Forza Italia (FI), 
headed by Silvio Berlusconi, which competed for much of the same voting demographic 
as the LN (Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull 2001; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). For the 
1994 general elections Berlusconi formed a coalition by utilizing two separate electoral 
pacts, the Polo della Libertá (Pole of Liberty), with the LN and the Polo del Buongoverno 
(Pole of Good Government) with the Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social 
Movement, MSI), a neo-fascist party (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). The alliance 
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between the regionalist LN and the statist MSI would ultimately doom this coalition to 
failure. 
In the general election of 1994 the Lega Nord was able to take 8.4% of the 
proportional representation votes, making it a major parliamentary force as Berlusconi’s 
victorious coalition came to power (Cento Bull and Gilbert; Richardson and Colombo 
2012). The first Berlusconi government (Berlusconi I) was short lived however, due to 
the inability of the LN to reconcile its differences with FI and the Allienza Nazionale
2
, 
causing the LN to leave the coalition, and thus the fall of Berlusconi I in 1995 (Coleman 
1996; Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Richardson and Colombo 2012). 
It was during Berlusconi I that the Lega’s disagreements with their coalition began to 
radicalize some into ‘independentists’ (Cento Bill and Gilbert 2001). The fall of the first 
Berlusconi government would lead the Lega Nord to attempt to characterize its former 
allies, FI and the AN, as rightist radicals (Koff and Koff 2000). This would also lead the 
Lega Nord to enter a new phase in its spatial demands, campaigning for secession of the 
North into an imaginary country called ‘Padania’ (Coleman 1996; Cento Bull and Gilbert 
2001; Giordano 2004; Cento Bull 2009; Massetti and Toubeau 2013) 
From Berlusconi I to the 1999 EP Elections (1995-1999) 
The Lega Nord, now out of government, needed to construct a new identity for 
itself as other mainstream parties began to embrace federal reforms (Albertazzi 2006; 
Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The governing center-left coalition, headed by Romano 
Prodi, was now implementing gradual federal reforms on leftist terms that would still 
promote interterritorial equality while sharing more power with the regions; these powers 
                                                          
2
 The MSI dissolved and changed its name to the Allienza Natzionale in 1995 in an attempt to break its 
conflation with its neo-fascist past (Koff and Koff 2000). 
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included direct election of regional presidents and more autonomy over economic 
development (Massetti and Taubeau 2013). The Lega Nord now began to campaign for 
all out secession of the North to create the country of ‘Padania’ (Coleman 1996; Cento 
Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2004; Albertazzi 2006; Cento Bull 2009; Cento Bull 
2011; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). On September 16
th
 1996, the Lega Nord presented 
The Declaration of Independence and Sovereignty of Padania declaring the independence 
of 11 regions of Northern Italy (Emilia-Romagna, Friuli, Liguria, Lombardy, Marches, 
Piedmont, Trentino-Alto Adige, Tuscany, Umbria, Aosta Valley, and the Veneto) into a 
federal republic known as Padania (Lega Lombardia Sezione Origgio). This movement 
stressed that the ethnic roots of Northern Italy were different from that of Southern Italy 
(Albertazzi 2006; Cento Bull 2009; Woods 2009; Cento Bull 2011; Woods 2011). The 
Lega Nord tried to characterize the South as Mediterranean or Roman, while they could 
not define their own ethnic roots as solidly, as Bossi claimed that the Northern ethnic 
roots were Germanic and later claimed that they were Celtic (Albertazzi 2006; Woods 
2009; Woods 2011). 
During this period the Lega Nord was highly supportive of the European Union, 
seeing it, as many other regionalist groups saw the EU at the time, as part of a framework 
for creating a ‘Europe of Regions’ (Giordano 2004). This idea was adopted by several 
secessionist parties in Europe, and promoted European integration with the regions, not 
the states, being the main actor (Giordano 2001; Giordano 2004). The EU was originally 
attractive to the Lega Nord because it was viewed as a mechanism that could undermine 
the centralized authority of the Italian state (Ibid). The EU had opportunities for the 
representation of the interests of Northern Italy directly without the interference of the 
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Italian state, such as the Council of Regions and the European Parliament (Ibid). One of 
the greatest fears of the LN in the late 90’s, and of many Italians, was that Italy would not 
meet the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) set to launch 
in 1999 (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2001; Giordano 2004; Albertazzi and 
McDonnell 2005). Since much of the Lega’s support came from Northern small business 
owners who would benefit greatly from the increased trade of the common currency, the 
Lega Nord used this as a justification for secession (Giordano 2001; Giordano 2004). 
Their fears were not confirmed however; as Italy was able to meet the criteria in time to 
be admitted to the common currency in the first round of admissions (Giordano 2001). 
In terms of electoral strength, secessionism paid off well for the Lega Nord in the 
1996 general elections, receiving 10.1% percent of the vote, the most the LN has received 
in any general election (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2001; Cento Bull 2009; 
Massetti and Toubeau 2013). In its strongest constituencies the Lega Nord received over 
30% of the vote, and it was the first place party in Lombardy and the Veneto (Cento Bull 
2009; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). Though this position may have given the LN a 
temporary boost for the election, with the relatively weak support
3
 for the secessionist 
movement made their territorial claims for the government unrealistic (Cento Bull and 
Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2004). The LNs secessionist stance puts it in an awkward 
position where it must balance the ability to achieve actual results for its voters, and its 
desire to create the state of Padania, which is not likely working in the context of the 
political system (Giordano 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). 
                                                          
3
 In a poll conducted in January of 1998 68.9% of Northerners interviewed identified secessionism as 
‘unacceptable or disastrous”, and 17.4% identified secession as advantageous but unacceptable (Cento Bull 
and Gilbert 2001). The Lega Nord may have had strong electoral support however, 86.3 % of Northerners 
opposed secession, making the demand unrealistic. 
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The unsustainability of the LN’s secessionist position quickly became apparent. 
Divisions began to appear not only within the party’s elites, but between the regions 
considered to be part of Padania as well (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). Debates raged 
about whether the constitution of Padania should be confederal or federal, and the Liga 
Veneta preferred an approach that involved working with mainstream parties to achieve 
an autonomous status for the Veneto within the Italian state, as its neighbors Trentino-
Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia already had (Ibid). The inability of the Lega to 
deliver to its constituency became apparent in the 1999 European Parliament (EP) 
elections, where the LN received 4.49% of the vote, a 2.1% decrease from the last EP  
election in 1994 (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Massetti and Toubeau 2013; NSD). 
From the EP Elections to the General Elections of 2013 (1999-2013) 
After the electoral failure of the LN at the EP elections in 1999, the Lega Nord 
rekindled its relationship with Berlusconi, joining his new coalition the Casa della Libertá 
(CdL), which included Forza Italia, the Lega Nord, the AN, and a Christian Democratic 
Party known as the UDC (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; 
Massetti and Toubeau 2013). This political alliance was now feasible because of the 
switch of the Lega Nord’s demands to ‘devolution’ of state authority, and because of a 
closer personal relationship between Bossi and Berlusconi (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2005; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). This alliance may have saved the LN from becoming 
completely irrelevant, as they only received 3.9% of the vote in the 2001 general election, 
not enough for their defection from the CdL to threaten the Berlusconi government; 
however, despite being a small party in the second Berlusconi government (Berlusconi II) 
the LNs members were still given control of several key ministries (Albertazzi and 
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McDonnell 2010; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The Lega Nord’s political behavior 
within the CdL can be characterized as loyal to Forza Italia, but once again antagonistic 
with the Allienza Nazionale and with the UDC (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). 
Despite their disagreements with the other junior members of the coalition, the Lega 
Nord served as part of the longest serving parliamentary government in Italian history 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). This is remarkable because the coalition contained the 
Lega Nord, a party that just two years ago campaigned for the breakup of Italy, and the 
Allienza Nazionale, a party that was born out of the neo-fascist MSI and advocated for a 
strong central state. 
It was during this period that the Lega Nord began to take a strong stance against 
the European Union (Giordano 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005). This stark 
contrast to its previous idea of the ‘Europe of Regions’ began shortly after Italy’s 
admission into the Eurozone (on time disconfirming the Lega’s fears) in 1999, and also 
as it became increasingly apparent that the EU was headed in a more intergovernmental 
than supranational direction, and institutions like the COR had relatively little power 
(Giordano 2001; Woods 2009). The rhetoric of the LN toward the European project now 
characterized it as a homogenizing force that threatened to undermine the unique local 
cultures and small enterprise in the North (Giordano 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2005; Woods 2010). The LN no longer represented solely the interests of the North, but 
the fears of many Europeans about the forces of globalization (Girodano 2001; Albertazzi 
and McDonnell 2005; Woods 2010). 
The fear of globalization can be seen in another issue area that received emphasis 
from the Lega Nord during this period, a fear which they shared with many of their other 
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partners in the CdL, immigration (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Woods 2009; 
Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010; Woods 2010; Richardson and Colombo 2012). 
Immigration in Italy has expanded rapidly, in fact the number of immigrants tripled in the 
period between 1991 and 2001 (Colombo 2013). The issue of immigration has been an 
increasingly salient issue among the Italian population in the past few decades, as it is a 
relatively recent phenomenon, starting in the 1980s, for what had historically been a 
largely emigrant country (Colombo 2013). Very few laws existed in Italy to control 
immigration, and the LN and the CdL capitalized on this issue by implementing more 
restrictive immigration policies (Woods 2010; Richardson and Colombo 2012; Colombo 
2013). 
The Lega Nord’s shift from hardline secessionism to devolution and anti-
globalization and their cooperation with the CdL paid off electorally. The LN increased 
their national percentage in the Regional elections of 2004 and the EP elections of 2005 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010). The success of the 
LN can be attributed to its ability to cooperate with the CdL, and therefore deliver on 
policy, and still retain a unique identity within the CdL (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2005). The LN made modest gains in the 2006 general election, receiving 4.58% of the 
vote, a .64% increase from the 2001 general election, and although this electoral gain 
seems modest the LN was increasing its membership despite the overall decline in party 
affiliation in Europe (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010). The 2006 election brought the 
center-left coalition back into government; however, this government was quickly 
removed in the 2008 general election (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010; McDonnell 
2013). In 2008 the CdL underwent two significant changes: FI and the AN merged to 
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form the Popolo della Libertà (PdL), and the UDC defected from the coalition, leaving 
the LN and the PdL as the two main parties (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010; McDonnell 
2013; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). This election was a great success for the Lega Nord 
receiving 8.3% of the vote, regaining much of the ground the LN had lost since 1996 and 
cementing its role as a vital coalition member in the CdL (Albertazzi and McDonnell 
2010). The PdL won 47% of the vote giving the CdL a comfortable majority (McDonnell 
2013). 
Tensions began to rise between Berlusconi and Gianfranco Fini, the leader of the 
former AN, causing Fini to form his own party, Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (FLI) in 2010 
(McDonnell 2013). This party alone was not enough to remove Berlusconi III from 
power, and it was not until the onset of the Eurozone crisis in 2011 did Berlusconi lose 
enough support to warrant his resignation (McDonnell 2013). The end of Berlusconi III 
marked the last time that the Lega Nord has been part of a governing coalition. 
Berlusconi was succeeded by a temporary technocratic government led by economist 
Mario Monti (McDonnell 2013). 
The Elections of 2013 and Beyond 
There is not yet much literature that focuses on the Lega Nord in the period after 
the fall of Berlusconi III. One of the contributions I will expect that my research will 
have is to provide evidence for a new, more extreme period of the LN’s spacial demands 
from the central government. From preliminary research it seems that the LN’s new 
leader, Roberto Maroni, seems to be making more radical demands in terms of Northern 
autonomy. At the State’s General of the North, a party conference for the LN, in 2012 
Maroni stated that one of his 12 points was to “form a Euroregion of the North, 
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Constitutionally self-determined” (Il Sole 24 Ore 29 Sept 2012). The theme for one of 
their newest campaigns for visual propaganda is “Prima il Nord” (the North First), which 
may suggest a shift away from the visual propaganda that was largely anti-immigration 
and anti-EU that Dwayne Woods identified (2009; 2010). 
The results of the 2013 general election could also have a profound impact on the 
LN’s spacial demands according to my theoretical framework, which will be presented in 
Chapter IV. Il Movimento 5 Stelle (the Five Star Movement, M5S), led by comedian 
Beppe Grillo, is largely an anti-politics movement, and gained the greatest share of the 
vote. As it will be demonstrated in Chapter VI, the LN received less than half of the share 
of the vote that they received in the 2008 general election. As noted by previous authors, 
one of the reasons why many in the North voted for the Lega Nord was out of protest and 
distrust in the central government. Perhaps the M5S has taken this issue away from the 
LN, and because the party is not regionalist it could have a much broader appeal as a 
protest party. If this is the reason for the LN’s poor performance in the 2013 general 
election, then my theoretical framework would suggest that the LN might be headed into 
a period of more extreme demands in order to remain a relevant party. 
In December of 2013, the Lega Nord underwent another leadership change. 
Matteo Salvini defeated Umbeto Bossi in an election for Party Secretary, the top 
leadership position in the LN (Agence France Press 2013). He has taken a decidedly anti-
EU stance claiming that the Euro is a “crime against humanity (Agence France Press 
2013). In 2014 Salvini backed other independence movements across Europe, including 
Scotland and Catalonia (Agence France Press 2014). He is also making waves at the EU 
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level by entering into an EP coalition with the National Front in France and several other 
anti-EU parties across Europe (Agence France Press 2014).
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CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will outline the theoretical assumptions that have guided and will be 
tested in this study. This chapter will also outline hypotheses about specific variables and 
their relation to the change in the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. The chapter will begin by 
examining the external variables. It will give a synopsis of Sartori’s theories of coalition 
and blackmail potential. These theories inform the hypothesis that the Lega Nord will 
augment its spatial demands as an electoral strategy in order to maximize votes. The 
subsequent section will provide an overview of various theories relating party strategy 
with economic conditions. These theories will be the basis for the hypothesis that there is 
no correlation with the reality of economic conditions and the Lega Nord’s spatial 
demands. The following section will focus on theories of how internal variables affect 
party demands. These theories will inform two hypotheses. The first is that the personal 
preferences of Umberto Bossi facilitated the ability of the Lega Nord to change its spatial 
demands. The second is that Matteo Salvini’s leadership brought new spatial demands 
and strategies for achieving them. The final section will examine theories of a variable 
that does not neatly fit into the categories of external and internal variables: the “other”. 
The theory of “othering” in group identity will inform the hypothesis that when the Lega 
Nord conceptualizes the
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“other” as an entity within Italy its spatial demands will be more radical than when it 
conceptualizes the “other” as an entity outside of Italy. 
The Electoral Explanation: ‘Coalition’ and ‘Blackmail’ Potential 
The first assumption proposed in Harmel and Janda’s (1994) An Integrated 
Theory of Party Goals and Party Change is that “Parties are conservative organizations 
and resist change”, thus change will only occur given a certain stimulus. The theory also 
proposes that vote seeking parties are more likely to change based on the magnitude of 
their electoral failures (1994). Later, large N studies confirmed this proposition using 
empirical data (Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012), and other studies would 
go on to identify other variables within the electoral system, such as the policy position of 
rival parties (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), to have an impact on party change. This 
study will examine the impact of electoral performance and the policy positions of other 
major Italian parties on the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
The risk of uncertainty associated with policy change is not one that a party is 
likely to make devoid of adequate information to assess the potential positive and 
negative repercussions of that change; gauging the public’s opinion by analyzing 
electoral results can be a source of such information (Somer-Topcu 2009). This electoral 
information can be a source of information for parties, but a later study found that party 
responses to electoral stimuli were dependent on the party’s composition. James Adams 
and his colleagues found that niche parties tend to respond to changes in the position of 
their own membership, rather than changes in the median voter as the mainstream parties 
do (Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow 2006). 
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The Lega Nord is a niche party, as it has never performed at the levels of the 
mainstream Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD) or Forza Italia (Go Italy, FI), 
nor does it appeal to the general Italian electorate, as it is regionally based. Although the 
study of Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow (2006) found a correlation showing that 
niche parties tend to be more responsive to voters within their own ranks, it does not 
necessarily mean that all niche parties are. There is nothing that by definition would 
prevent a niche party from responding to electoral results like a vote seeking party from 
Harmel and Janda’s (1994) theory. This raises the questions of whether there are 
exceptions to Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow’s (2006) findings and whether the 
Lega Nord is one of them.
4
 
Giovanni Sartori’s (1976) theory of coalition and blackmail potential argues that 
political parties are relevant so long as they can influence policy, regardless of if they are 
in or out of the governing coalition. Coalition potential is the ability of a party to 
influence policy decisions through its inclusion in the ruling coalition. This influence 
becomes stronger if the party’s withdrawal would cause the coalition to lose the 
parliamentary majority. Blackmail is ability to influence the policy agenda of other 
parties through the threat of electoral losses (Evans 2002; Massetti, and Toubeau 2013). 
In times when the Lega Nord campaigned for federalism it was attempting to set the 
policy agenda through coalition potential. In times when the LN campaigned for 
secessionism it did not believe the statewide parties to be taking federalism seriously 
enough, and exerted their influence by punishing them through electoral losses. 
                                                          
4
 This would be an interesting question to pose, as the Lega Nord was not part of Adams, Clark, Ezrow, and 
Glasgow’s (2006) analysis, though it examined European parties from 1976-1998. 
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In Sartori’s Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis (1976) he 
addresses a question that is often taken for granted: what makes a party strong? He posits 
that many scholars have tried to quantify a specific electoral threshold that would be 
sufficient to render parties relevant or irrelevant, but according to Sartori “[T]his is no 
solution at all, for there is no absolute yardstick for assessing the relevance of size…The 
relevance of a party is a function not only of the relative distribution of power-that is 
obvious-but also, and especially, of its position of value, that is, of its positioning on the 
left-right dimension. Thus a party that ranges at the 10 per cent level may well count for 
less than a party that obtains only a 3 per cent level” (1976). The percentages a party 
receives can be vital information to assessing the strength of a party, but it is only a single 
aspect of a party’s power to have a meaningful effect on public policy. Sartori identified 
two other aspects: Coalition potential and blackmail (1976). 
Coalition potential is the bargaining power that a party receives through becoming 
a feasible member of a governing coalition (1976). This power is based on the size of the 
need of a coalition to obtain a majority, which is related to a party’s electoral strength, 
and the feasibility of the coalition, which is unrelated to a party’s electoral strength 
(1976). For example, it would make sense that parties not included in a coalition that has 
a sizeable parliamentary majority would have little coalition potential because they have 
little to offer and would necessitate more compromise within the coalition. It would also 
make sense that parties of radically different ideologies, such as communists and fascists, 
would not be likely to join in a coalition together, regardless of the balance of 
representation in the legislature. Sartori identifies two rules for deciding on a party’s 
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relevance. The first rule is that a party can be considered irrelevant if it cannot be 
realistically brought into a coalition (1976). 
The implications of coalition potential are apparent in the case of the Lega Nord. 
In the first Berlusconi government the LN was not able to push through its own policy 
agenda because the coalition comprising the Lega Nord and the Allienza Nazionale was 
not feasible. The core ideology of LN was regionalist while the Allienza Nazionale, 
composed primarily of members from the neo-fascist MSI, favored a strong central state. 
Despite being at its electoral height in 1996, it became quickly became apparent that the 
LN had relatively no power during its secessionist phase because of its unwillingness to 
cooperate to form a government as a result of its ideological distance from the other 
parties (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Massetti and 
Toubeau 2013). Despite the strong electoral performance, the LN was unable to form a 
feasible coalition, and thus unable to govern. Consistent with Sartori’s theory, even in 
periods when the LN has had less electoral support, its coalition potential had made it 
more powerful, especially when its defection from the government would have caused its 
collapse as in 2008. In the 2000s the LN moderated its demands, promoting devolution 
over federalism and was also able to find common ground with the Allienza Nazionale  
on the issue of immigration (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005), thus paving the way for a 
feasible, stable coalition.  
The second rule of Sartori’s theory is that a party can remain relevant out of 
government if it has the ability to direct the tactics or direction of political competition 
(1976). Sartori defines this as blackmail potential, the ability to have relevance in 
opposition to the governing coalition (1976). Without the second rule party’s only have 
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relevance so long as they can govern. Theoretically the first rule would discount even 
major opposition parties as irrelevant. However, the second rule outlines scenarios, in 
which, opposition parties can utilize strategies to alter the course of political behavior. 
Sartori notes that blackmail potential is mainly exercised by anti-system parties (1976). 
Scholars have identified different strategies that parties can utilize to exercise their 
blackmail potential. One of these methods is to punish major parties by winning over 
portions of their electorate (Massetti and Toubeau 2013). 
This can be seen in the case of the Lega Nord through its position on federalism 
and its relationship with Forza Italia. The Lega Nord was successful in its early years 
partially because it was the only party to embrace federal reform (Cento Bull and Gilbert 
2001; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). However, in the mid-90s several other parties, on 
both the right and the left, embraced federal reform in order to attract more votes (Cento 
Bull and Gilbert 2001; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). They were also able to exercise their 
blackmail potential when they pulled out of the first Berlusconi government and 
campaigned on secessionism, winning over much of Forza Italia’s Northern electorate in 
1996 (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Massetti and 
Toubeau 2013). 
Both in the cases of parties utilizing their coalition potential and parties utilizing 
their blackmail potential their power can potentially increase if they can win over a larger 
portion of the electorate. From a brief overview of the historical record it would seem that 
the Lega Nord has responded more to external factors in the electoral system than the 
opinions of their own party. Based on Harmel and Janda’s (1994) theory, this study 
hypothesizes that ethno-regionalist parties will change their spatial demands based on 
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electoral factors, specifically poor electoral performance and the policy positions of other 
parties. If this hypothesis is substantiated through the data it would suggest that the LN 
does not behave as a traditional niche party, but as a vote maximizing party. 
The Economic Explanation: Reality vs Perception 
The economic conditions within a state have been theorized to have an impact on 
whether or not political parties will change their demands. Existent market forces create 
new actors that compete for the attention of elected officials, and their interests are 
sometimes at odds with those of the voters (Haupt 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). 
Global economic forces also have the ability to coerce parties to change their demands 
when they are at odds with the party’s policy agenda (Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). Ezrow 
and Hellwig provide the example of the French Socialist Party in the 1980s, which 
implemented a strategy to come into line with global capitalism, rather than the agenda of 
nationalization and redistribution it had campaigned on, in order to fulfill requirements 
for receiving IMF loans.  Economies are becoming increasingly globalized, which has 
made parties more responsive to economic stimuli worldwide with respect to their policy 
positions (Haupt 2010). It is clear that economic conditions has some sort of an impact on 
whether or not a party will change its policy, but how parties will respond to these 
economic shifts is a question that has been less explored. 
If the Lega Nord is behaving as a vote seeking party, the state of the economy 
could theoretically have an impact on whether or not it will change its spatial demands. 
However, the primary goal of a vote seeking party is amassing as much electoral support 
as possible. Therefore, the economy would only have as much of an impact to the degree 
which it resonated with the voters. It is highly unlikely that the majority of the voters has 
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a high degree of technical economic literacy and consistently tracks accurate economic 
data. It is also possible that the opinions of voters regarding the economy could be 
manipulated by various interactions via social networks or the media. 
It is probable that the majority of the voters in the electorate are not skilled 
economists, and constantly tracking accurate economic data. If these voters utilizing 
imperfect information and their opinions can be subject to various manipulations of 
others through communication, then the decisions the voters reach are not likely to be 
based on economic reality, but the perception of economic reality. This is the basis for 
the economic hypotheses of this study. The spatial demands of the Lega Nord will not be 
correlated to the performance or globalization of the Italian economy; rather it will be 
correlated with the LN’s ability to convince its supporters of an alternative reality. 
The Internal Explanation: Individual Level Actions 
While external stimuli serve as a catalyst for party change, ultimately it is the 
internal factors that will determine how and why the party will react to these stimuli 
(Panebianco 1988; Harmel and Janda 1994). External factors alone are insufficient to 
fully understand party change. Several empirical, large N studies have found internal 
factors to be significant (Katz and Mair 1994; Aldrich 1995; Harmel 1995; Schumacher, 
De Vries, and Vis 2013). These factors could include the change in a dominant faction, 
change in party leadership, and change in the distribution of power between elites and 
activists. 
Change in the leadership of the party, which in some cases could be related to a 
change in the dominant party faction, has been identified as a factor that can significantly 
alter party demands. Although change in the dominant party faction will always result in 
48 
 
leadership change, leadership change is not necessarily a result of a change in the 
dominant party faction (Harmel and Janda 1994). Harmel and Janda (1994) argue that 
leadership change can result in a party utilizing new methods to achieve their goals. 
Leadership change was soon after found to be significant in an empirical study (Harmel 
1995). 
Studies have shown that the organization of a party can have an impact on its 
demands. Older studies have shown that parties dominated primarily by their leadership 
are more prone to office exclusion than others. Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis more 
recently conducted an empirical study that found the distribution of power within parties 
to have a significant effect on party change (2013). This study found that parties in which 
power was concentrated primarily with the party’s elites were more responsive to 
changes in the median voter, and more prone to change in general than parties dominated 
by their activists, which tend to respond more to changes in their own membership 
(2013). 
Theories and empirical studies have shown that the internal factors of changes in 
dominant party factions, change in leadership, and the distribution of power can all have 
an effect on whether or not a party will change its demands. However, all of the previous 
studies have examined the effects of these variables separately, and do not entertain the 
possibility that these internal factors might not only have an effect on party change, but 
possibly on each other as well. In order for there to be competing factions within a party, 
there must first be space in the party for factions to develop and oppose the dominant 
faction. The same is true of leadership change. If other potential party leaders cannot 
criticize or differ with the opinions of the party leadership, then it will allow the current 
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leadership to take complete control of the party. In this situation leaders would be likely 
to be able to keep power for as long as they please, and the leaders that follow are likely 
to be carbon copies of those before them. 
Schumacher, De Vries, and Vis (2013) study the effects of the power differential 
between leadership and activist dominated parties, but these are the only two distinctions 
made, when in reality the level of concentration of power in a party is a continuum. Some 
activist dominated parties can have power concentrated more or less than other activist 
dominated parties. The same is true of leadership dominated parties. Some leadership 
dominated parties can have power concentrated more or less than other leadership 
dominated parties. 
The Lega Nord’s power structure is frequently described as personalist. This 
study defines personalist parties as a political party in which internal power is 
concentrated so heavily in the leadership that most power is concentrated in one leader. 
These parties frequently become a cult of personality. Based on this logic this study 
makes two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the individual level actions of 
Umberto Bossi will be a relevant factor for determining the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
The second hypothesis is that the leadership of Matteo Salvini will bring about new 
spatial demands. 
The Identity Explanation: The “Other” 
One factor that has yet to be explored by the literature on party change, though 
has been studied extensively in the literature on group identity, is the concept of 
“othering”. This factor does not easily fall into the category of internal or external factors, 
as it is caused by the external “other”, but the “other” is part of a group’s identity. One of 
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the earliest conceptions of the theory of “othering” came from Edward Said’s work 
Orientalism (Johnson and Coleman 2012). In his work Said posits that the idea of the 
‘Orient’ is a Western conception, a necessary conception for the West to define itself 
against (1977). As Europe defined itself against the East “The Orient [became] an 
integral part of European material civilization and culture” (1977). For Said, despite the 
fact that the Orient was a Western conception of Eastern culture, it nonetheless took on a 
real form in the European identity itself. 
Johnson and Coleman describe the idea of the “other” as “the intentional 
construction of a region as different from, perhaps even antithetical to, national norms 
and values as an element of nation-building” (2012). Much of the literature regarding 
“othering” is divided between particularists, who believe that there must be an ‘other’ in 
opposition to a specific group to construct its identity, and those who argue that the 
“other” need not be the antithesis of a particular group. Even for those that believe that to 
construct identity the relationship of the “other” need not be adversarial (Abizadeh 2005), 
they still acknowledge that identity is based on something that makes one group different 
than another. 
Although there has always been a divide between the Northern and Southern 
regions of Italy, the LN’s platform emphasizes these cultural differences between the 
regions, thereby, creating separate identities for the Northern regions and the Southern 
“other”. However, the South has not always been targeted as the primary “other” in 
antithesis to the Lega Nord, as immigrants and the European Union have also been 
targeted (Giordano 2001; 2004; Woods 2009; Cento Bull 2009; Richarson, and Colombo 
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2013). Although the LN never abandons its Northern roots, it seems that immigrants have 
become the new other, replacing the South (Woods 2009).  
The theory of the necessity of “othering” in order to formulate an identity seems 
to fit the LN and its ability to rapidly change its demands because its identity and claims 
to a separate ethnicity of “Padanians” is weak. Before the Italian unification Padania had 
never been a united entity, in fact, Piedmont, one of the regions that the LN claims as a 
part of Padania, was one of the driving regions of the Italian unification. The Savoy 
dynasty, the monarchy that united Italy, was the ruling dynasty of Piedmont. The LN’s 
sense of identity is still subject to change and the party has a very flexible decision 
making structure (Giordano 2001), in fact the specific ethnic roots of Northern Italy that 
Bossi has claimed has changed between Germanic and Celtic (Woods 2009). With such 
an unstable identity the LNs perception of its role as a party, and thus its demands are 
very sensitive to what it considers to be the “other”. 
This study will connect the group identity theory of “othering” with the subject of 
party demands by analyzing and if and how it has affected the Lega Nord’s spatial 
demands. Logically it seems that a group that perceived an “other” inside of the state 
would view the state with less legitimacy, as it would not be likely that the group would 
view the state as governing a unified people. However, a group that perceived “others” 
external to the state would be more likely to view the state with more legitimacy and 
perhaps even nationalistically, as it does not view the state as fragmented. Based on the 
theory of “othering” this study hypothesizes that when the Lega Nord has identified the 
“other” as an “other” inside of Italy they will have more radical spatial demands, while in 
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periods where the Lega Nord has identified an “other” outside of the state its spatial 
demands would be more moderate. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will explain the methodology and data that will be utilized in this 
study to test the hypotheses presented in the last chapter. The first section will describe 
the case study of the Lega Nord and why it is an ideal case to examine why ethno-
regionalist parties change their spatial demands. The next section will explain the case 
study method, its merits, and its deficiencies. The following sections will present the 
research designs and data sources that will be used to answer the hypotheses in the 
analysis chapters. 
Lega Nord as a Case Study of Ethno-Regionalism 
This study will address the question of why ethno-regionalist parties change their 
demands through a case study of the Lega Nord, an ethno-regionalist party based in 
Northern Italy. The party’s identity has proven to be extremely malleable due to its weak 
ethnic ties, Umberto Bossi’s leadership, and grassroots party structure (Giordano 2001). 
The Lega Nord’s ethnic identity is weak amongst its membership largely because it was 
fabricated to justify political action in favor of Northern industrial economic interests; the 
region that the LN claims to be Padania, separate from the Southern Italians, has never in 
history been politically or culturally united (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; 
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Paasi 2009; Cento Bull 2011; Massetti, and Toubeau 2013). “Padanian” ethnic identity is 
so weak that it is largely defined by what it is not, the ‘other’, than what it is (Woods 
2010). The personalistic hierarchy of the Lega Nord, revolving around its charismatic 
leader, Umberto Bossi, and its grassroots support base, have made the party ideologically 
unsound and easily subject to change in policy demands (Koff and Koff 2000; Giordano 
2004).  
The Lega Nord’s weak ideology makes it an ideal case study for analyzing the 
factors that cause ethno-regionalist parties change their political demands because their 
ideological weakness makes them extremely sensitive to these factors. The frequent 
oscillations in demands between federalism and secessionism allow for a systematic 
examination of the factors that cause a change in political demands that would not be 
possible by examining more ideologically sound ethno-regionalist parties that have 
infrequently or never changed their demands.  
Since its inception the Lega Nord has had four distinct periods regarding their 
ethno-regionalist demands. Anna Cento Bull identified three of these periods: from 1984 
to the collapse of the first Berlusconi government in 1995 the LN campaigned for 
federalism; from the fall of the Berlusconi government to 1999 the LN campaigned for 
the secession of Padania from Italy; from 1999 onward the LN campaigned for 
devolution and fiscal federalism (2009). Since Cento Bull wrote in 2009 new 
developments have occurred in Italian politics, including the fall of the third Berlusconi 
government, in which, the Lega Nord was a coalition member. In December of 2013 the 
Lega Nord reverted back to secessionism. Despite these developments, there is little 
scholarship examining the behavior of the Lega Nord after the fall of the third Berlusconi 
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government. Massetti and Toubeau (2013) predicted that the LN would be taking a 
secessionist turn. However, there has yet to be a systematic after this development 
occurred. This study, through the examination the factors that cause ethno-regionalist 
parties to change their spatial demands, will provide evidence to suggest that the Lega 
Nord has entered a new period in their political demands. 
Table 1: LN Spatial Demands over Time
5
 
Period Demands 
1984-1995 (Fall of Berlusconi I) Federalist/Autonomist 
1995-1999 (European Parliament 
elections) 
Secessionist 
1999-2013 (Italian general elections) Moderate Federalism/Devolution 
2013-Present Autonomist (appears to be taking 
secessionist turn)
6
 
 
Merits and Limitations of the Case Study 
The case study method is appropriate for examining the oscillation of demands in 
European ethno-regionalist parties because there are a small number of cases for 
comparison. One of the traits that make the Lega Nord such an interesting case for a 
study of ethno-regionalism is their ability to become an established force in the Italian 
political system capable of representation at the national level. When the Lega Lombardia 
and other Northern leagues began the movement for Northern autonomy in the early 80’s 
they were not taken seriously by many under the assumption that they, like many other 
ethno-regionalist parties, were to be a short lived fringe movement (Cento Bull and 
Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2004). The Lega was also able to capitalize on mass distrust of 
the Italian political system, and was gaining momentum as the Tangentopoli crises led to 
                                                          
5
 Information from 1984-2009 from Cento Bull (2009), the periods following are based on my own 
assesment 
6
 Note: This period of the LN’s history of demands has not yet been recognized by the literature. I expect I 
will find this to be true through my examination of the electoral manifestos and propaganda. 
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the establishment of the Second Republic, allowing it to establish itself as a major 
political force on the national stage within just years of its inception (Cento Bull 2001; 
Massetti and Toubeau 2013). Few ethno-regionalist parties have the longevity or 
command the influence that the Lega Nord does, making it difficult to conduct a 
systematic comparative study with such a small number of cases. With a limited number 
of cases, limited resources, and limited literature, the case study becomes a useful method 
of inquiry, though it does come with its disadvantages as well (Lijphart 1971; Collier 
1993). 
One of the main advantages to utilizing a case study is the rich contextual detail 
that illuminates the particular case that would be lost in a large N study (Ibid). Given the 
relatively recent focus on ethno-regionalist parties, the small N of established parties, and 
the ambiguity in their classifications, there is a high risk of committing what Giovanni 
Sartori (1991) defined as concept stretching. This is the idea that loose definitions and the 
comparisons of cases that are not comparable can lead to poor conclusions (Ibid). 
Looking at one specific case, in detail can further the understanding of ethno-regionalist 
parties without concept stretching. Case studies can also be utilized in further research as 
a building block for more generalizable studies. 
Case studies also have disadvantages that need to be acknowledged. One such 
problem is that case studies have less external validity, and are less generalizable than 
other methods, such as the statistical that allow for more control (Lijphart 1971; Collier 
1993). Without other cases to compare that could possibly falsify a hypothesis, it is 
difficult to rest a generalizable conclusion solely on a case study (Lijphart 1971). This 
study by no means suggests that its conclusions will be completely generalizable to the 
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oscillation in demands of ethno-regionalist parties. Rather, this specific case has in it the 
opportunity to analyze a major political movement, and its change over time. As more 
research on ethno-regionalism is produced or perhaps if more major ethno-regionalist 
movements occur that have erratic demands, then the conclusions that will be made in 
this study can be tested outside the context of Italy and the Lega Nord. 
Data and Methodology: Electoral Factors 
In the previous chapter it was hypothesized that the Lega Nord change its spatial 
demands based on factors outside of the party, specifically poor electoral performance 
and the policy positions of other parties. The data source that will be utilized to test this 
hypothesis is the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP)
7
. This source has coded the 
electoral manifestos of various political parties, including the Lega Nord, based on issues 
that the manifestos have addressed. This source also provides electoral data for the year 
the manifestos were released. The CMP has coded electoral manifestos for the LN for all 
the national elections between 1992 and 2013. They also have the original documents for 
the 1994, 1996, and 2001 national elections. This data source provides excellent data both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. CMP does not have data for the Lega Nord manifestos 
during European Parliamentary years. In order to fill this gap the European Election 
Database, provided by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services, will be utilized
8
. 
This will give vital information for the 1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014 European 
Parliamentary elections.  
The two electoral factors that will be examined in this chapter are electoral 
performance and policy change in other parties. To test whether electoral results have an 
                                                          
7
 Data can be accessed at <https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/> 
8
 The European Election Database can be accessed at 
<http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_database/index.html> 
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impact on the LN’s spatial demands, spatial demands will be compared with previous 
electoral results in order to determine whether or not they have an impact on their policy 
position. For the years available (1996-2001) qualitative data will be compared from 
manifestos in order to obtain a deeper, more contextualized understanding of the spatial 
shifts taking place. The analysis will begin at 1992, as the CMP does not have data on the 
Lega Nord’s manifestos before this time. This is not problematic, however, as 1992 was 
the first major breakthrough of the LN on the national stage. In previous elections they 
did gain many, if any seats in parliament and were primarily a regional power.  
To address the question of whether or not the policy positions of competing 
parties have an effect on the LN’s spatial demands data from the CMP will once again be 
utilized. To test this hypothesis the spatial demands in the Lega’s manifestos will be 
compared to those of its rival parties, specifically Forza Italia (Go Italy, FI), Il Popolo 
della Libertà (The People of Freedom, PdL), the Ulivo (the Olive Tree coalition), the 
Partito Democratico (Democratic Party, PD), and Il Movimento di Cinque Stelle (The 
Five Star Movement, M5S). FI policy positions can be compared with the LN’s from its 
beginnings in 1994 to the election of 2006. Forza Italia then merged with several other 
minor right parties and became the PdL in 2008, and the CMP has manifesto data for 
both the 2008 and 2013 elections for the PdL, which will allow for a gapless comparison 
with the LN. The data for the major parties on the left has more holes however. The data 
starts with the Ulivo for the 2001 and 2006 elections, and then the PD for 2008 and 2013. 
Therefore, the comparison with the left will have to begin in 2001, but a gapless 
comparison can be conducted after this year. The CMP has data on the only electoral 
manifesto of the M5S in 2013. Therefore the LN will only be compared to the M5S for 
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that election. This comparison will be drawn mostly to create an informed prediction 
about the future of the Lega Nord’s spatial demands based on the data analysis. 
I expect to find that in periods in which the Lega Nord can address policy issues 
salient to the public that other political parties are failing to address their spatial demands 
will be more moderate because they will have greater coalition potential, and thus access 
to political power. However, if other parties begin to address the same salient issues as 
the Lega Nord it will revert to more radical spatial demands, such as secession, to remain 
relevant among the electorate and exercise its power through blackmail, by taking away 
voters from the more established parties. From analyzing both qualitative and quantitative 
data regarding the electoral system the relation to the LN’s spatial demands can be better 
understood, and the merits and shortcomings of applying the generalized theories of party 
change to ethno-regionalist parties. 
Data and Methodology: Economic Factors 
Based on the assumption that the Lega Nord is a vote seeking party, it was 
hypothesized in Chapter III that the state of the economy would have no relation to the 
Lega Nord’s spatial demands. Rather, because the LN behaves as a vote seeking party, 
the voter’s perception of the economy would be a more important stimulus than the actual 
state of the economy. This hypothesis will be put to the test in Chapter VII using 
empirical data. The chapter will also analyze how the Lega Nord’s spatial demands have 
allowed or inhibited the party to influence the Italian economic agenda. 
To test this question I will use economic data regarding GDP per capita and GDP 
growth from the World Bank
9
. The World Bank has annual data for these two measures. 
These measures will be compared against time periods of the Lega Nords spatial 
                                                          
9
 Data accessible at <http://data.worldbank.org/country/italy> 
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demands. I expect to find that these measures will not correlate with the demands of the 
LN. Qualitative data will also be utilized in order to compare what the LN’s perception of 
the Italian economy is against the actual state of the Italian economy. 
Time series data will also be utilized from Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
Zurich
10
 on Italy’s measure of economic openness. Haupt (2010), as mentioned in 
Chapter II suggested that parties behave differently depending on their level of economic 
openness. By comparing Italy’s level of economic openness across time, it can be 
determined whether or not this has an effect on their spatial demands, and what sorts of 
responses that economic openness elicits from ethno-regionalist parties. Based on the 
previous hypotheses I expect to find that there is no correlation between the level of 
economic openness and the LN’s spatial demands. 
The final portion of this analysis will utilize the historical record as data. This 
section will analyze how the spatial demands have affected the Lega Nord’s ability to 
influence the Italian economic agenda. Through the analysis of spatial demands as the 
independent factor and the LN’s influence of the Italian economic agenda as the 
dependent factor the relationship between economics and spatial demands can be 
assessed. This section will analyze what types of economic policies the LN has supported 
and actualized in and out of government. This analysis will show how the oscillation of 
spatial demands can affect the economy, rather than how the economy can affect the 
oscillation of spatial demands. 
Data and Methodology: Internal Factors 
There were two hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter related to internal 
variables that will be tested. The first hypothesis is that the individual level actions of 
                                                          
10
 Data accessible at <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/query/> 
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Umberto Bossi will be a relevant factor for determining the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
The second hypothesis is that the leadership of Matteo Salvini will bring about new 
spatial demands. These hypotheses will be tested using the case study of the Lega Nord. 
Though the findings will not be generalizable to all parties using the case study method 
they could suggest whether these hypotheses are worthy of studying in a more general 
context. Based on the aforementioned hypotheses it can be expected that Umberto 
Bossi’s leadership will be a key factor in the low leadership turnover and the lack of 
changes in dominant party factions. It can also be expected that Bossi’s actions as a 
leader will play a role in the change of the LN’s spatial demands that the external factors 
alone cannot account for. 
For a case study of the Lega Nord it would not make sense to analyze the 
previously identified factors of power distribution, change in the dominant coalition, and 
leadership change in the LN quantitatively. There has been little change in these factors 
throughout the Lega’s existence. Therefore there is not enough quantitative data to assess 
the impact of these factors. Power has been highly concentrated with the elites, 
specifically the party’s leader. There has also never been a faction in the party that has 
dissented from this leadership. There is not enough quantitative data on the LN’s internal 
factors for a quality quantitative analysis to be conducted on its relation to spatial change. 
The lack of change of these factors during the many years of Umberto Bossi’s 
leadership presents a unique opportunity to study changes at the individual level. Studies 
examining party change frequently ignore this level of analysis. Due to the high 
concentration of power under Bossi there were no changes in leadership, dominant party 
faction, or power structure, effectively controlling for these previously identified factors 
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of party change. This study will qualitatively analyze how the personal actions and 
relationships of Umberto Bossi had an impact on the ability of the Lega Nord to oscillate 
in its spatial demands. 
Recent developments in the Lega Nord have produced two changes of leadership. 
Umberto Bossi stepped down as party leader in 2012, making way for Roberto Maroni. In 
December of 2013 Umberto Bossi attempted to reclaim his position as party leader, only 
to lose in an election to the current leader, Matteo Salvini. This study will qualitatively 
assess the changes in spatial demands brought about under Matteo Salvini’s leadership. 
Data and Methodology: “Othering” 
In the previous chapter it was hypothesized that when the LN had conceived the 
“other” as something internal to Italy it would have more radical spatial demands, and 
when the Lega perceived the “other” as something external from Italy then it would have 
more moderate spatial demands. To answer this question both qualitative and quantitative 
data sources will be utilized based on the Lega Nord’s visual propaganda and its 
manifestos. 
Based on the aforementioned hypotheses, it can be expected that the Lega’s 
oscillation in their demands of spatial rearrangement from the central government has 
been consistent with a change in its perception of the ‘other’. One source of data will be 
from the Lega Nord itself. The LN’s website has an archive of visual propaganda 
organized by year
11
. From this coding will be utilized to determine whether or not a 
spatial demand or an “other” is being presented in the advertisement, and if so what 
spatial demand or “other” is being presented. The percentages for certain spatial demands 
                                                          
11
 Visual propaganda archive can be accessed at <http://www.leganord.org/index.php/il-movimento/la-
nostra-storia/manifesti?showall=&start=1> 
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and “others” will be compared throughout the years in which the visual propaganda is 
available for. This archive comes directly from the party, therefore, it will be an accurate 
representation of its demands, as it is a primary source. 
Though the Lega’s archives will be an accurate data source to make comparisons 
from, it is not a complete source, as the visual propaganda has only been archived since 
2000. Therefore, LN electoral manifestos will also be examined to see how their policy 
positions and priorities have changed over time. Once again data will be utilized from the 
CMP to better answer this question. Numerical percentage data on the frequency of 
certain issues appearing will be used as well as excerpts from the documents themselves 
when available. The numerical mention of specific issues will be compared by year in 
order to assess whether the “other” the LN has identified indeed has changed overtime, 
and the degree to which the spatial demands have as well. 
From this data I expect to find that in periods when the Lega Nord has held more radical 
demands the ‘other’ was has been Rome (the Italian central state) and Southern Italy. 
However, when the Lega Nord has held more moderate spatial demands from the 
government the ‘other’ has been Brussels (the European Union) and immigrants. This is 
not to suggest that I expect to find the old policies preferences or ideology to be 
completely different from those they held during other time periods. Rather I expect to 
find that the old ideology and conception of the other will still be present; however, the 
Lega’s conception of the other will shift in emphasis and its prioritization. This analysis 
will yield knowledge on a factor that has yet to be explored in the literature on party 
change and that does not fit neatly into the category of internal or external factors.
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CHAPTER VI 
ELECTORAL FACTORS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine electoral and party manifesto data in order to test the 
hypothesis that factors in the electoral system will cause the Lega Nord to oscillate 
between more moderate and more radical spatial demands. The first section will briefly 
revisit the theory and hypothesis that were outlined in detail in Chapter IV. The second 
section will examine data from the European Election Database, provided by the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services, versus the LN’s historical spatial strategy in 
order to assess whether or not past electoral performance has played a role. The 
subsequent section will compare data across election years from the comparative 
manifesto project. The Lega Nord will be compared with its main electoral competitor 
Forza Italia in regard to similarities on policy stances, specifically federalism. The final 
section will examine the results and come to a conclusion about the extent of the impact 
of electoral factors on the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
Theory and Hypothesis 
Several scholars have noted that factors related to the electoral system can act as 
motivating factors for party change (Harmel and Janda 1994; Somer-Topcu 2009; Ezrow 
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and Hellwig 2012; Schumacher, de Vries, and Vis 2013). One of the most extensively 
studied of these factors is change in the electorate. In Harmel and Janda’s (1994) 
“Integrated Theory of Party Change” they proposed that for vote seeking parties the 
greater the magnitude of their electoral loss, the greater the likelihood it is that the party 
will change. According to Zeynep Somer-Topcu (2009) this is because there is a risk 
associated with party change. For a party to be willing to assume this risk they need more 
information about how the public is reacting to their policies, and electoral performance 
can be a source of this information (Somer-Topcu 2009).  
Under the assumption that the Lega Nord behaved as a vote seeking party, I 
hypothesized in Chapter IV that electoral factors would have an impact on their spatial 
demands. Specifically in regard to electoral performance, I believe that oscillations in 
spatial demands will be adjusted in order to maximize votes. As theorized by Harmel and 
Janda (1994) large electoral losses are likely to result in changes of the LN’s spatial 
demands. The following section will test this hypothesis utilizing data from the European 
Election Database. 
Another electoral factor that has been identified by the literature as having an 
impact on party change is the policy positions of other parties. The policy position of 
rival parties has been found to be a relevant factor for party change, especially amongst 
parties of the same ideological family (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Based on this 
logic I believe that the Lega Nord will oscillate its spatial demands when other parties 
begin to adopt similar stances on issues, specifically in regard to federalism.  
In this chapter, this hypothesis will be tested utilizing data from the Comparative 
Manifesto Project. This data source tracks the percentage of electoral manifestos that are 
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devoted to specific issues. The Lega Nord’s spatial demands will be compared with the 
percentage of time that is devoted to the issue of federalism for the LN’s main electoral 
competitor Forza Italia and other major Italian parties. Based on the aforementioned 
hypothesis, it can be expected that change in the LN’s spatial demands will be more 
likely when FI and the other major parties devote less of their manifestos to the issue of 
federalism. 
Electoral Performance 
Table 2: LN Electoral Results, National and EP Elections
12
 
Election Year Election Type LN % Share of Vote 
1992 National 8.65 
1994 National 8.36 
1994 European Parliament 6.56 
1996 National 10.07 
1999 European Parliament 4.49 
2001 National 3.94 
2004 European Parliament 4.96 
2006 National 4.58 
2008 National 8.07 
2009 European Parliament 10.20 
2013 National 4.08 
2014 European Parliament 6.16
13
 
Source: European Election Database, Provided by Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
                                                          
12
 Some of the data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on material from the "European 
Election Database". The data are collected from original sources, prepared and made available by the 
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). NSD are not responsible for the analyses/interpretation of 
the data presented here. 
13
 This datum was taken from the European Parliament website. It was missing from the EED. 
<http://www.results-elections2014.eu/en/country-results-it-2014.html#table02>   
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The data in Table 2, taken from the European Election Database, contains every 
national and European Parliament (EP) election that the Lega Nord has participated in 
from 1992 onward. The Lega Nord had taken part in the 1987 national election however; 
at this point they were not a major party. Therefore, it is appropriate to begin the analysis 
in 1992. The elections are sorted by year and labeled as either national or EP elections. 
The elections that are in white are in periods where the Lega Nord advocated for 
federalism or devolution, and the elections in grey are occurred in periods when the Lega 
campaigned on more radical spatial demands. 
When examining the data in Table 2, some general trends can be observed. The 
first is that the Lega Nord’s share of the vote seems to remain stable or gradually 
increase, with the exception of certain times when there appear to be electoral “shocks”. I 
define an electoral shock as a dramatic decrease in a party’s share of the vote in 
comparison to the last election. With the exception of three electoral shocks, in 1994, 
1999, and 2013 there has never been a decrease in the LN’s share of the vote that has 
been greater than 0.55%. The decrease in the share of the vote in 2001 and 2006 is so 
miniscule that it should be considered to have remained stable. However, in 1994 there is 
a drop of 1.8% in their share of the vote. In 1999 there is a drop of 5.8%, and in 2013a 
drop of 6.12%. Admittedly the shock of 1994 is much smaller than the shocks of 1999 
and 2013. However, the Lega Nord lost 1.8% of the vote in a matter of months in the 
1994 EP election, as the EP election occurred in June and the previous general election 
occurred in March of the same year. Losing 1.8% of the vote in three months could be 
very alarming information for a vote seeking party. Still, the 1994 shock was relatively 
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modest, which may suggest that other factors were involved with this switch in spatial 
demands. These factors will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
The second trend that can be observed is that the shocks are typically followed by 
a sizable electoral gain. This can be seen in the 1996 election when the Lega Nord gained 
3.51% share of the vote and again in 2012 when the LN gained 2.08% of the vote in only 
a year. However, the same trend does not occur after the electoral shock of 1999. In fact 
there is actually a modest decrease in the next election of 2001 of 0.55%. It takes several 
years for the LN to regain its electoral support after the shock of 1999. Over the period of 
2001 to 2009 the Lega Nord’s share of the vote either remains relatively stable or is 
increasing. This suggests that adjustments were made to the LN’s platform that made it 
more appealing to the mass electorate, even if it did not get the immediate electoral boost 
that occurred after the shocks of 1999 and 2013. Once again, though the evidence 
supports this trend, other factors are likely to be at work here as well, and they will be 
examined in subsequent chapters/sections. 
The final trend that can be observed is that changes in spatial demands occur 
following the electoral shocks of 1994, 1999, and 2013. The colors on the chart, white for 
moderate demands and grey for more radical demands, change with the electoral shocks. 
There are no exceptions to this trend for the time period being examined. However, there 
have only been three oscillations of spatial demands over this period of time, one of 
which occurred recently. It is possible that more radical demands could result in 
immediate electoral payoffs, while more moderate spatial demands result in gradual 
electoral payoffs. Still one should not rush to this conclusion, as there has only been 1 
instance in which the LN has switched to more moderate spatial demands. Therefore 
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there is not enough data to come to this conclusion. I do not intend to suggest that this 
trend is guaranteed to continue, but that for now there isn’t anything to suggest otherwise, 
and the data seem to support this trend. As more elections occur and data is collected on 
them future research should continue to look for anomalies in this trend. 
The data from the EED seems to support the hypothesis that oscillations in spatial 
demands will be adjusted in order to maximize votes. It can be observed in Table 2 that 
spatial demands are changed immediately following large electoral shocks. Table 2 also 
shows that adjustments in spatial demands also seem to result in an increase in electoral 
support. This increase could be immediate in the cases of 1996 and 2014, or it could be 
gradual, as in the case of 2001. From this analysis, it can be concluded that the Lega Nord 
does indeed behave as what Harmel and Janda (1994) describe as a vote seeking party. It 
can also be concluded, consistent with Somer-Topcu’s (2009) findings, that the LN has 
utilized electoral outcomes to inform its decisions regarding party change. 
Positions of Other Parties 
Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) argued that the position of other political parties 
is a relevant factor for party change. They go on to suggest that parties are more sensitive 
to shifts within their own ideological family (e.g. parties on the right are more sensitive to 
shifts in other parties on the right). Based upon the logic of these findings this study has 
hypothesized that the Lega Nord will oscillate its spatial demands when other parties 
begin to adopt similar stances on issues, specifically in regard to federalism. Table 3 
compares the Lega Nord to another member of its ideological family and the largest party 
of the right in Italy, Forza Italia. The LN and FI have traditionally competed for the same 
segment of the electorate (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). 
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Table 3 presents data for the Lega Nord and the FI/PdL for every general election 
held in Italy between 1992 and 2013 on the percentage of their electoral manifesto that is 
dedicated to the issue of federalism. This data was taken from the Comparative Manifesto 
Project, a data source that codes manifestos to determine the percentage and frequencies 
of mentions of various issues. The column shaded in grey was the 1996 election, and is 
shaded because it is the only general election in which the LN campaigned for 
secessionism (radical demands). 
Table 3: Percent of Manifesto dedicated to Federalism in General Elections 
Election Year LN FI/PdL
14
 
1992 12.6% X 
1994 12.6% 2.2% 
1996 13.8% 3.7% 
2001 4.8% 4.3% 
2006 0.0% 0.0% 
2008 31.1% 2.4% 
2013 3.3% 3.3% 
Source: Comparative Manifesto Project 
When examining the data in Table 3, it does not seem to support the hypothesis 
that the Lega Nord’s change in spatial demands would occur with oscillations in FI’s 
agenda on federalism. However, this is not to say that FI’s stance on federalism had no 
impact upon the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. Adams and Somer-Topcu’s (2009) study 
concluded that parties sensitive to the policy shifts of other parties, and were particularly 
sensitive to the policy shifts within their own ideological families. They argued that 
                                                          
14
 Percentages are taken for FI in 1994-2006 and the PdL in 2008 and 2013 after FI merged with the AN to 
form the PdL. 
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parties tend to move in the same direction as other parties within their ideological family. 
The hypothesis of this study, based on the finding that shifts in other political parties are 
relevant and the idea that parties can exercise power through coalition and blackmail 
potential, expected to find that in periods when Forza Italia focused more on federalism it 
would push the Lega Nord to more radical spatial demands, and when FI focused less on 
federalism the Lega Nord have more moderate spatial demands. 
Table 3 does not seem to support either trend throughout the entire period of the 
analysis. This does not mean that the idea that other parties of the same ideological 
family have had no effect on the LN’s spatial demands should be rejected. When 
examining the time period before the 2001 election the Lega Nord does in fact have more 
radical spatial demands as FI enters the political arena and begins to adopt federalism as a 
larger share of its platform. After 2001, Adams and Somer-Topcu’s argument seems to be 
correct, as the two parties converge on the issue of federalism (with the exception of the 
2008 election which will be explained momentarily). 
What could have caused the switch from the LN following a path of divergence 
with Forza Italia to one of convergence on the issue of federalism? One explanation, 
which would perfectly align with the data, is that parties will respond differently to the 
policy shifts of other parties, even those in their own ideological family, depending on 
whether or not the parties are political allies or foes. Prior to the 1999 EP elections the 
Lega Nord had been competitive with Forza Italia, and even when the two parties were in 
a governing coalition together, the relationship was tense and was one of the factors of 
Berlusconi I’s early demise (Coleman 1996; Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and Gilbert 
2001; Richardson and Colombo 2012). The switch from the LN as a competitor with FI 
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to one of its closest allies occurred after the 1999 EP parliamentary election, with the 
formulation of the CdL (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; 
Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The change in the relationship between the Lega Nord and 
Forza Italia lines up perfectly with the change from divergence on spatial demands to 
convergence.  
One of the reasons this process of convergence seems to occur in the case of the 
LN after 2001 is because in many of these elections the Lega Nord and FI run on the 
same manifesto after the creation of the CdL. There appears to be one anomaly in the 
data after this point in 2008, when the LN devote 31.1% of their manifesto to federalism, 
while FI only devotes 2.4% to the issue. Albertazzi and McDonnell (2010) argued that in 
2008 part of the reason for the success of the LN was due to its establishment of “issue 
ownership” over the issues of federalism and security. The Lega Nord became the arm of 
the CdL that promoted federal and security
15
 reform. Though more research will have to 
be done across many parties to substantiate the claim that the relationship between parties 
of ideological families can play a role, the analysis of the Lega Nord in relation to FI 
highlights the shortcomings of applying generalized models to ethno-regionalist parties 
and the merits of a thorough case study. 
Conclusions 
From analysis of electoral and manifesto data it can be concluded that factors in 
the electoral system do have an impact on the oscillation of the LN between more radical 
and more moderate demands. The spatial demands oscillate after every electoral shock 
over the period from 1992-2014, suggesting that the Lega Nord does behave as a vote 
                                                          
15
 For the Lega Nord this largely meant immigration. 
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seeking party, and will modify its policy in order to obtain the largest percentage of the 
vote possible. This would confirm Harmel and Janda’s (1994) theory that vote seeking 
parties adjust their policy demands in order to gain the largest share of the electorate 
possible, and Somer-Topcu’s (2009) claim that parties utilize past electoral data as a 
source of information  to navigate the risks of party change. However, this would also 
suggest that even though the Lega Nord is a niche party, it does not behave as Adams, 
Clark, Ezrow, and Glasgow (2006) argued it should. The Lega Nord seems to be trying to 
maximize its voting base rather than please the supporters it already has.  
Though this study’s hypothesis that the Lega Nord would become more radical as 
Forza Italia increasingly addressed federalism was proved to be wrong, however, the data 
appear to have a sort of pattern that could possibly be grounds for future research. FI did 
increasingly embrace federalism, and the LN did radicalize their spatial demands, but this 
process stopped by the 2001 election. After this election a process of convergence 
between the two parties occurred on the issue of federalism, consistent with trends found 
by Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009). This might suggest that the relationship between 
two parties, even of the same ideological family, could have an effect on the way the 
parties react to each other’s policy shifts. This would be an interesting topic for future, 
more comprehensive research, but is beyond the scope of this study. 
Overall, when examining the factors of electoral performance and the position of 
other parties, it seems that the Lega Nord follows the generalized trends found by large N 
case studies only to a certain extent. Upon close examination through a case study, it can 
be seen that certain niche parties can behave as normal vote seeking parties. The 
experience of the LN also shows that parties may have different reactions to the policy 
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shifts of other parties based on their relationship with them. This data shows that future 
research should not hastily assume that generalized research on party change to ethno-
regionalist parties, especially when it comes to treating them the same as other niche 
parties. It also highlights the merits of the case study as a method for a deep 
contextualized understanding of specific political parties and their relationship with other 
parties in the political system.
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CHAPTER VII 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will analyze the relationship between economic factors and the Lega 
Nord’s spatial demands. The first section will be an overview of theory that relates 
economics to party change, and the hypothesis. The second section provides a brief 
overview of the economic data in relation to spatial demands. This study has 
hypothesized that there will be no correlation with economic openness and the LN’s 
spatial demands. Therefore, the subsequent section will venture to find if the inverse is 
true through the use of qualitative data on the past economic policy position of the LN. 
This section will examine how the Lega Nord’s spatial demands have allowed it to 
influence the Italian economic agenda. The final section will come to conclusions about 
the relationship between economics and spatial demands. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Globalization’s march forward has caused the increased integration and 
interdependence of economies between states. This is especially true of the member-
states of the European Union. Previous empirical studies have related economic variables 
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to party change in general (Haupt 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). Specifically, they 
examine the globalization of economics in relation to change in party demands. Haupt 
(2010) found that as economies globalize that parties become more sensitive to global 
economic shifts. While Ezrow and Hellwig (2012) found that global economic forces 
have coercive power to influence political parties to change their policy stances. Both 
studies note that the interests of the electorate and the interests of economic actors are 
frequently at odds (Haupt 2010; Ezrow and Hellwig 2012). 
In the previous chapter the data supported the claim that the Lega Nord behaved 
as a vote seeking party. However, Haupt (2010) and Ezrow and Hellwig (2012) found 
that the interests of the electorate and the interests of economic actors are frequently at 
odds. For this reason, it would seem unlikely that the Lega Nord could both behave as a 
vote seeking party and be responsive to global economic forces. It also seems unlikely 
that a significant portion of the electorate would have enough economic literacy and be 
tracking accurate data to make their vote based upon complete information of the state of 
the national/global economy. 
Cento Bull (2011) argues that the Lega Nord engages in “simulative politics”, in 
which many of their policy demands are symbolic and emotional in their nature and do 
not reflect the reality of a newly globalized world. She also notes that even though 
European economies depend on liberalization of markets to become competitive populist 
parties have been able to convince a portion of the electorate that protectionist policies 
would be a viable solution (Cento Bull 2011). This suggests that the Lega Nord may not 
base its demands about the actual situation of globalization of economies, but what they 
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can convince the electorate the state of the globalized economy is and what it can 
convince the electorate is a feasible solution to these problems.  
Based on the idea that the LN, like many populist parties, uses simulative politics 
as a strategy I have hypothesized that there will be no correlation between the openness 
of the Italian economy and its spatial demands. However, this does not mean that I expect 
to find that there is no relationship between economic factors and spatial demands. Based 
on Giovanni Sartori’s theory of coalition and blackmail potential I believe that the Lega 
Nord’s ability to influence the Italian economic agenda will oscillate with its spatial 
demands. Specifically, this study hypothesizes that when the Lega Nord has more 
moderate spatial demands its coalition potential will increase, thus increasing its ability to 
influence economic policy. 
Economic Openness vs Spatial Demands 
Table 4 presents data taken from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology 
Zurich
16
 on Italy’s level of economic openness over time. The table measures the KOF 
Index of Economic Globalization in Italy over the period of 1992 to 2011. This index 
measures the level of economic openness of a country on a scale of 1 to 100 with higher 
numbers indicating greater economic globalization. Once again, the years that the Lega 
Nord has had more radical spatial demands are shaded in grey. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Data accessible at <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/query/> 
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Table 4: Economic Globalization in Italy, KOF Index by Year 
Year KOF Index of Economic Globalization 
1992 58.58 
1993 64.27 
1994 64.92 
1995 66.66 
1996 67.61 
1997 71.67 
1998 74.52 
1999 74.54 
2000 76.53 
2001 73.89 
2002 72.65 
2003 71.42 
2004 73.87 
2005 72.78 
2006 72.48 
2007 73.76 
2008 72.32 
2009 70.56 
2010 71.16 
2011 70.28 
Source: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich 
From examining the data in Table 4 it does not appear that there is any apparent 
trend relating the level of economic globalization and the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
Admittedly the KOF index was at some of its highest levels for this period of time in 
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1998 and 1999. However, it climbed even higher the subsequent year when the LN 
switched to its most moderate demands ever, arguing on a platform of devolution. Also, 
the original switch to secessionism in 1996 occurred when the KOF Index was 67.61, 
which is relatively low compared to the KOF Indexes for every subsequent year, which 
have never dipped below 70.28. When examining Figure 1, presenting visually the 
information of Table 4, it appears that the switches to secessionism and then back to 
devolution occurred in a period when the KOF index stabilized between 70 and 77 after a 
consistent climb throughout the 90’s. Based on the data from the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology Zurich, it would seem that economic openness does not have an effect on 
the spatial demands of the LN. 
 
Figure 1: KOF Index of Economic Globalization in Italy 1992-2011 
Source: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich 
The Lega’s Influence on the Italian Economic Agenda 
The levels of economic openness demonstrate that there is no correlation with the 
reality of economic openness in Italy and the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. Even though 
the Lega Nord may have been created as a reactionary movement in the face of 
globalization, economic globalization cannot explain the oscillation in its spatial 
demands, the core issue of ethno-regionalist parties. This does not necessarily mean that 
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there is no correlation between spatial demands and economics, however. The inverse 
may be true. The Lega Nord’s spatial demands seem to have allowed it to impact the 
Italian economic agenda, specifically through there protectionist policies toward 
immigrant labor. 
The Lega Nord has been able to implement its protectionist economic agenda on 
the national stage through the issue of immigration. According to the LN’s website, 
without a reaction to illegal immigration, “In this way the doors open to an economically 
and socially uncontrolled invasion that we cannot sustain anymore
17”. Massetti and 
Toubeau (2013) argued that the Lega Nord’s ability to influence the territorial agenda can 
be explained through the electoral logic of Sartori’s (1976) theory of coalition and 
blackmail potential. I agree with this argument and will argue that the Lega’s ability to 
influence the Italian economic agenda follows a similar logic. However, I believe that the 
LN will only be able to exert economic influence through coalition potential, and that 
they have been particularly effective in implementing their protectionist agenda through 
the issue of immigration. 
Historically speaking, the Lega Nord has had much more success influencing the 
policy agenda while it was in government than it had as a protest party utilizing its 
blackmail potential. In 1994 the LN cemented itself as a force on the national level by 
entering Berlusconi I with 8.4% of the national vote, its first ruling coalition (Cento Bull 
and Gilbert 2001; Richardson and Colombo 2012). The electoral success meant that the 
Lega had enough representation in parliament to make itself an indispensable junior 
                                                          
17
 “In questo modo si spalancano le porte ad una invasione incontrollata che, socialmente ed 
economicamente, non possiamo più sostenere.”  Source: 
http://www.leganord.org/index.php/seguici/eventi/referendum Date Accessed: 08/28/2014 
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coalition member of Berlusconi I. Sartori’s (1976) theory of coalition potential states that 
the coalition potential of a party is determined by two components, the need for more 
support in the coalition and the feasibility of the coalition. The need for the LN in 
Berlusconi I was evident, which gave the LN enough coalition potential to be offered a 
place as a junior member of the coalition. However, there was not enough coalition 
potential to sustain the coalition, as the Lega Nord’s spatial demands made it infeasible. 
Although not yet at the point of campaigning for the secession of Padania, the LN was 
uncompromising, making it impossible to cooperate with the statist, neo-fascist junior 
coalition member, the MSI. This eventually caused Berlusconi I to fall by 1995 due to the 
Lega pulling out of the coalition (Coleman 1996; Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and 
Gilbert 2001; Richardson and Colombo 2012). 
In 1996 the Lega Nord had begun to openly campaign for the secession of 
Padania, and had denounced its former allies FI and the AN as rightist extremists (Koff 
and Koff 2000). This shift in spatial demands did have a sizable electoral payoff in the 
1996 general elections when the LN won over 10% of the vote (Massetti and Toubeau 
2013). The Lega now had even more representation than it had when it was a member of 
Berlusconi I, and the right had need of this representation to form a government. 
However, this coalition was now even less feasible than the previous coalition. There was 
now even more animosity between the parties after the fall of Berlusconi I, and the 
territorial demands that had been the cause of previous tensions between the Lega Nord 
and the AN had now become even more radicalized. 
After the 1999 EP elections, which the Lega Nord experienced a large electoral 
shock, they were able to reestablish its relationship with Forza Italia, as one if its most 
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loyal allies, and joined the CdL coalition, consisting of FI, the LN, the AN, and the UDC 
(Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Massetti and Toubeau 
2013). The Lega had now moderate its demands to the devolution of state authority to the 
regions (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). The CdL was 
more feasible than the previous Berlusconi government, as the LN had moderated its 
spatial demands, and there was now one coalition rather than two separate electoral pacts 
forged by FI. The need of the FI for the Lega Nord was not that great, as the LN’s pulling 
out of the government would not have affected its stability. However, the extra support of 
the Lega made Berlusconi II’s stability less fragile. 
While in government the Lega Nord was able to establish issue ownership over 
the issues of federalism and security (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010). The most central 
axis to the LN’s security policy was immigration. In fact the Lega’s focus on immigration 
gave it more coalition potential by creating an area of agreement and cooperation 
between them and the AN. This is best exemplified in the passage of the Bossi-Fini 
Law
18
 of 2002 regulating immigration. One of the major curbs on immigration this law 
contained was requiring non-EU immigrants to have a work contract signed by an 
employer providing for round trip travel from and back to the immigrant’s home country 
before a visa could be issued (Paparella and Rinolfi 2002). This poses an incredible 
hardship for prospective immigrants because they typically take low level work and their 
jobs require more flexibility (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). This law also 
allowed the Prime minister to set a cap on the number of permits issued in a year and 
                                                          
18
 The law was named for Umberto Bossi, the leader of the LN, and Gianfranco, Fini the leader of the AN. 
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made it possible to immediately deport illegal immigrants, and detain suspected illegal 
immigrants while investigating their identity (Paperella and Rinolfi 2002). 
Berlusconi III was the government in which the LN had the highest level of 
coalition potential than at any other point in its history. This is reflected through the 
protectionist immigration measures it was able to implement. After winning 8.07% of the 
vote the Lega Nord was now indispensable to the Berlusconi Government. Its spatial 
demands were moderate as well. For the first time both conditions for strong coalition 
potential were met. They were needed for the government to have a majority in 
parliament and they were moderate enough to make a feasible coalition with the PdL. 
The Lega’s cooperation with the coalition was rewarded with LN members being given 
control over key ministries, specifically pertinent to this analysis the Ministry of the 
Interior (Albertazzi and McDonnell). Under the third Berlusconi government Roberto 
Maroni, now leader of the Lega Nord, was named Minister of the Interior 
(Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). Maroni was able to pass a security package, 
regarding immigration, some measures of which were so extreme they were ruled 
unconstitutional by the Italian constitutional court (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). 
This package extended the time that suspected illegal immigrants could be detained under 
the Bossi-Fini law of 2002, barred them from all administrative acts, and introduced 
territorial surveillance of citizen patrols (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). 
The passage of the security package, much of which was revoked by the 
Constitutional Court, illustrates a point of Albertazzi and McDonnell (2010), that many 
of the Lega Nord’s policy positions are unrealistic, and more of a symbolic “wish list”. 
The ability of the Lega Nord to pass such an extreme measure through a center-right 
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controlled government shows their power within it. With winning 8.07% of the vote they 
were able to pass legislation that was so extreme it was declared unconstitutional. This is 
illustrative to the fact that when the Lega has moderated on their spatial demands, they 
have been able sway the government into passing very extreme protectionist policy 
stances. 
The most glaring example of the LN’s coalition potential enabling it to influence 
the Italian economic agenda was the signing of the August 2008 Treaty of Friendship, 
Partnership, and Cooperation between Italy and Libya by Silvio Berlusconi and Mommar 
Gaddafi (Ronzitti 2009). Part of this treaty concerns cooperation in combating illegal 
immigration, in which Italy provides resources including patrol boats and satellite 
technology to patrol Libya’s coastline through joint forces (Ronzitti 2009). This 
agreement effectively stopped immigration from Libya to Italy from 2009-2011 
(Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). This agreement made it easier to turn ships 
carrying illegal immigrants around back to Libya before they have hit Italian shores 
(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010; Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). The agreement 
has caused many concerns regarding human rights due to this policy and because Libya 
has not ratified the 1951 Convention on Refugees (Ronzitti 2009; Triandafyllidou and 
Ambrosini 2011).  
This might come as a surprise because many of the business interests that support 
the PdL depend on the filling of the large amount of low skill jobs by immigrants 
(Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). However, this is where the Lega Nord can be 
seen flexing its muscle with its strong coalition potential. Although the PdL was clearly 
the dominant player in Berlusconi III, the LN was indispensable, and one way to appease 
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them was to give them control over immigration policy. FI did begin to adopt 
immigration as a larger issue in the Berlusconi governments (Triandafyllidou and 
Ambrosini 2011; Woods 2010). However, there is a notable difference, as the LN views 
immigrants as fundamentally different and having cultural differences that cannot be 
overcome; while other parties believe that the problem is a lack of assimilation among 
immigrants (Woods 2010). This can be seen in the treatment of asylum seekers in the 
wake of the Arab Spring. Berlusconi portrayed it as a tragedy while Umberto Bossi 
demanded the “immigrants out of here” (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). 
Conclusion 
The data from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich seems to suggest 
that there is no correlation between the actual state of openness in the Italian economy 
and the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. This comes contrary to studies conducted by Haupt 
(2010) and Ezrow and Helwig (2012). Perhaps this is because the Lega Nord engages in 
what Cento Bull (2011) describes as “simulative politics” in which symbolism becomes 
more important than the reality it is supposed to represent. In any case, the lack of a 
correlation between the Lega’s spatial demands and economic openness once again 
demonstrates the shortcomings of applying generalized models to ethno-regionalist 
parties. Rich contextual analyses allow for a better understanding of the peculiarities of 
specific parties. 
However, when analyzing the inverse relationship, the impact the Lega Nord’s 
spatial demands have on economic factors, there does appear to be a pattern. This pattern 
seems to be well explained by Sartori’s (1976) theory of coalition potential. In periods 
when the LN had more moderate spatial demands, they had greater coalition potential 
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with other parties on the right. Access to government power and the bargaining power 
that came with better electoral results gave the Lega the ability to implement protectionist 
immigration policies that were further right than the positions of FI. This is best 
exemplified with the 2002 passage of the Bossi-Fini Law, the 2008 Security Package, and 
the Signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Partnership, and Cooperation between Italy and 
Libya. Overall, this analysis demonstrates that the oscillation of spatial demands of 
ethno-regionalist parties can have drastic effects on their ability to make practical impacts 
on the national economic agenda.
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CHAPTER VIII 
INTERNAL FACTORS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the effect of internal factors on the Lega Nord’s 
change in spatial demands. The first section will review the theory and hypotheses 
relevant to the internal variables. The first section will utilize qualitative data from 
history to analyze the impact that Umberto Bossi’s personal relationships had on the 
party’s spatial demands. The subsequent section will qualitatively assess the changes in 
spatial demands and strategies for achieving those spatial demands that have been 
brought about by leadership change. The final section will conclude with a summary of 
findings and their implications. This chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the role 
of party leadership in the oscillation of their demands, and provide analysis of party 
demands at the individual level.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
Harmel and Janda’s (1994) Integrated Theory of party change suggested that 
leadership change and change in the dominant party faction both have an effect on party 
change. These propositions were later found to be significant in an empirical large N
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study (Harmel, Heo, Tan, and Janda 1995). Later Schumacher, DeVries, and Vis (2013) 
found that the distribution of power between elites and activists tend to have an effect on 
party change as well. While I do not doubt the validity of these findings, there has yet to 
be a study that examines the how the actions at the individual level have had an impact 
on party change. If a party leader has tight control over the party, then it seems logical 
that the leaders’ actions would have an impact on their party’s demands. 
Two hypotheses were presented in Chapter III regarding the internal 
idiosyncrasies of parties. The first hypothesis is that the individual level actions of 
Umberto Bossi will be a relevant factor for determining the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. 
The second hypothesis is that the leadership of Matteo Salvini will bring about new 
spatial demands. 
Individual Level Actions 
The Lega Nord’s concentration of power almost solely on its leader has 
constrained the ability of the leadership or dominant party faction from changing for 
almost 30 years. If changes in leadership and dominant party factions have not played a 
significant role during Bossi’s reign as party leader then what internal factor has? For 
most of the Lega’s history power has been concentrated with Umberto Bossi. What role, 
if any, have the personal actions of Umberto Bossi played in the oscillation of the LN 
from more moderate to more extreme spatial demands? 
Historically speaking, both the Lega Nord and Forza Italia have been under the 
control of their founders Umberto Bossi and Silvio Berlusconi, respectively. The 
relationship between the two parties was contentious at the beginning of the Second 
Republic. However, after the 1999 EP elections the LN and FI formed a close alliance 
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(Albertazzi and McDonnell 2005; Massetti and Toubeau 2013). This abrupt turnaround 
is strange, especially without a leadership change in either party. By Berlusconi III the 
LN was considered the closest ally to FI, so much so that they were the only party in the 
coalition that was not given the ultimatum of merging into the PdL or leaving the 
coalition (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2010). The LN was also rewarded with many key 
ministries in Berlusconi III for their loyalty (Massetti and Toubeau 2013). Two leaders 
that once denounced each other were now loyal allies. This section will examine the 
evolution of the relationship between Bossi and Berlusconi and its impact on the Lega 
Nord’s and whether or not it had an impact on the LN’s spatial demands. 
When Silvio Berlusconi entered the political arena in 1994 many of the Lega 
Nord’s activists opposed any sort of association with Forza Italia, as Berlusconi 
conflated with Bettino Craxi, a former prime minister with a reputation tarnished by the 
Tangentopoli crisis (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). However, this did not stop Bossi 
from forging an electoral pact with Berlusconi, indicating that if it was not for the pact 
the LN “would have been wiped out” (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). This exemplifies 
the lack of power the Lega’s activists had in comparison to Umberto Bossi. While the 
hardline activists wanted to cling to their fundamental values, Bossi was willing to keep 
his party alive and maximize its power by any means necessary. 
The electoral pact was not the result of a good relationship between the Lega 
Nord and Forza Italia, however. The relationship was merely convenient for both parties 
(Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). The FI still wanted to wipe out the Lega so they would 
have less competition for the northern electorate, and the activists of the LN still thought 
FI to be the old guard of corrupt politicians (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). It was not 
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until the realization that federal reforms were not a high priority of Berlusconi I that 
Bossi decided to bring down the government (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). After this 
moment the relationship between Bossi and Berlusconi and the LN and FI became 
hostile (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). The majority of the LN opposed the electoral 
pact, however, it was not until Bossi’s relationship with Berlusconi deteriorated that the 
decision was made to leave the government. It was after this point that the Lega Nord 
campaigned for secessionism. During this period he made openly provocative comments 
about FI and Berlusconi. 
Bossi was no doubt most loyal to Berlusconi during Berlusconi III. Silvio 
Berlusconi has been the center piece of political scandals for most of his life as a 
politician. However, allegations against Berlusconi have become increasingly common 
from his third government to the present day. Bossi’s support even in the face of 
Berlusconi’s scandals is best evidence by his comments to the United States ambassador 
according to one of the WikiLeaks cables. In regard to allegations that Berlusconi 
consorted with minors in 2010 Bossi told the US Ambassador that it was likely the work 
of the mafia setting a political trap for Berlusconi (Lister and Messia 2010). Bossi had 
no idea that his statement would be publicly leaked. This suggests that his relationship 
with Berlusconi was not just to convince the public of the coalition’s solidarity, and that 
he was willing to stand by Berlusconi even at the risk of being associated with his 
scandal. 
The Lega Nord and Leadership Change 
The power structure of the Lega Nord historically has been concentrated around 
its founder Umberto Bossi, a charismatic leader who attracted a populist support base 
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(Gilbert 1993; Koff and Koff 2000; Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001; Giordano 2004; 
Woods 2010). Bossi was able to attract a broad support base among the industrial areas 
of Northern Italy by using captivating and energetic speech, capitalizing on his working 
class background, and his utilization of symbolism. The LN became a quasi-cult of 
personality revolving around Bossi, and this allowed him to implement a party structure 
in which he personally had tight control over, leaving almost no room for dissent or 
critical debate from within (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). 
There have only been two leadership changes over the history of the Lega Nord, 
both of which occurred relatively recently. The first switch was from Umberto Bossi to 
the long time Lega member and current president of Lombardy, Roberto Maroni. Bossi 
resigned in April of 2012, despite objections from other party members, over a scandal 
regarding improper use of party funds (D’Emilio 2012). Maroni took over the role of 
party leader while Bossi took on a lesser role, and stated that he would back Bossi if he 
chose to resume his role (D’Emilio 2012). Maroni had been a loyal, long time party 
member and an ally of Bossi. His statement that he would back Umberto Bossi should he 
choose to run for party leader again showed that this change of leadership was relatively 
hollow. It was the result of an external circumstance, and Maroni was more of a place 
holder for Bossi than he was a true change in leadership. 
Though during the period when Bossi was no longer leader his control over the 
party waned. This could possibly be due to his absence from office or as a result of his 
political scandal. In December of 2013 Umberto Bossi lost the election for party leader 
to Matteo Salvini (Agence France Presse 2013). Regardless of the cause of Bossi’s 
weakening influence, Matteo Salvini was able to capitalize on it to become the party 
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leader. Bossi had tight control over the Lega Nord by concentrating power in himself. 
Even in the wake of his resignation, his replacement, Roberto Maroni, was loyal to 
Bossi and did not pose a threat for a possible re-entry into Bossi’s old position. 
However, in abscence, Bossi’s control over the party weakened, providing Matteo 
Salvini the opportunity to seize control. In slightly more than a year and a half’s time, 
Salvini took advantage of the weakening concentration of power within the party to 
wrestle away what Umberto Bossi controlled for almost three decades. 
Although Salvini took control of the party recently there are already observable 
changes in the Lega Nord’s demands and the strategies he is using to obtain them. He 
has taken a firm stance against the Euro, the EU, and has demanded the secession of 
Padania (Agence France Presse 2013). Unlike Bossi, who focused his attention primarily 
on domestic issues, Salvini seems to be taking a pan-European approach to secession. 
This strategy, though anti-EU, is not anti-European. The Basta Euro campaign, launched 
during Salvini’s leadership, is a tour of political rallies across Italy in opposition to the 
European common currency. The slogan for the campaign is “Another Europe Is 
Possible
19”. 
Salvini’s desire for another Europe can be seen in his political strategy. The Lega 
Nord has begun to make allies outside of Italy in the European Parliament. Currently the 
LN has joined into an EP coalition with other secessionist and euroskeptic parties, 
headed by Marine Le Pen’s National Front, a French nationalist party (Agence France 
Presse 2014). The LN now appears to be more involved in separatist and irredentist 
                                                          
19
 “Un’altra Europa è  possibile” Source: http://www.bastaeuro.org/ Date accessed: 09/02/2014 
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movements in Europe as well. Salvini has endorsed the secessionist campaigns of 
Scotland and Catalonia (Agence France Presse 2014). 
If the LN’s homepage20 is any indication of Salvini’s leadership style, it may 
suggest that he is attempting to create a cult of personality similar to that of Bossi. 
Image 1 shows the Lega Nord’s homepage as of September 2nd 2014. The first thing 
anyone visiting the site sees is two large images of Salvini, one of which being the 
background that appears on every page of the site. The presence of Salvini on every 
page of the LN’s site suggests that he might have some of the same personalist 
leadership qualities that Bossi had. This design might suggest that Salvini is the party. 
However, Bossi’s cult of personality took almost three decades to develop. 
 
Figure 2: Lega Nord Homepage, September 2
nd
, 2014 
It is too early to come to conclusions about Matteo Salvini and the degree to 
which power will be concentrated in him under his leadership. There are some early 
indicators to suggest that he may continue the Lega Nord’s tradition of personalistic 
leadership. However, the fact that he was able to wrestle power away from Umberto 
                                                          
20
 Source: http://www.leganord.org/ Date accessed: 09/02/2014 
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Bossi may suggest that power has now become more dispersed in the party. Time will 
tell whether Salvini will be the new Bossi or if the Lega’s activists will have greater 
influence on their policy. Regardless of whether or not Salvini’s tenure as party leader 
will represent a drastic reorganization of the party, it is abundantly clear that his 
leadership has changed the LN’s spatial demands, and its international involvement in 
other secessionist and irredentist movements. 
Conclusions 
It can be concluded from this analysis that individual level actions and leadership 
change have had an impact on the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. The study of the party 
leader is a level of analysis that is frequently ignored by the existent literature. The 
findings of this study suggest that further analysis of ethno-regionalist parties at the 
individual-level may be warranted. This study has also found that leadership change has 
been a relevant factor in oscillations of spatial demands. Although this factor has been 
previously identified by the literature, it was not until recently that the impact of 
leadership change could be studied in relation to the Lega Nord. 
Without other internal factors constraining Umberto Bossi his personal actions 
and relationships became an important factor in the Lega Nord’s oscillation between 
moderate and more radical spatial demands. This was particularly true of his relationship 
with Silvio Berlusconi and his decisions regarding the LN’s relationship with FI. Power 
was so concentrated that Bossi was able to ignore the many activists that opposed an 
electoral pact with Forza Italia. After the electoral pact was made, Bossi’s attitude toward 
Berlusconi soured after the refusal of Berlusconi I to make federalism a priority in the 
coalition’s agenda. Bossi soon split from the coalition and the Lega began to campaign 
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for the secession of Padania. After their electoral misfortunes in 1999 Bossi redeveloped 
a more amicable relationship with Berlusconi, and soon became the most loyal ally in the 
coalition. Later, in an attempt not to be conflated with Berlusconi’s scandals, Bossi’s 
distanced himself from Berlusconi. Thus, the LN distanced itself from FI. It is evident 
that the organization of the party has impacted its ability to cooperate and its spatial 
demands. 
Historically, the concentration of power in the LN in Umberto Bossi has 
constrained the ability of new leaders and factions to arise. Without room for descent, no 
faction or rival leader could establish itself as a dominant force. For most of the LN’s 
history the only option for those who disagreed with the party’s direction was to leave 
the party. Recent developments have taken power from Bossi and placed it with Matteo 
Salvini. Salvini has taken the party back on the path to secession, and under his 
leadership, the LN has become more vocal about self-determination outside of Italy, as 
well. This version of Padanian self-determination is one that is very different from the 
one Bossi proposed in the late 90’s.It is too early to conclude whether the old power 
structure has been destroyed permanently, or if the old personalistic structure will be 
rebuilt around Salvini. However, it is clear with the case of the Lega Nord that new 
leadership has brought about new spatial demands and a new international approach for 
achieving these demands.
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CHAPTER IX 
“OTHERING” 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine how the changes in the perceived “other” to the Lega 
Nord’s group identity has impacted the oscillation of their spatial demands between 
more moderate and more radical spatial demands. The first section will review the 
relevant literature and hypotheses derived from them. The second section will utilize 
quantitative data to assess the change in the LN’s perception of the other. I have 
collected this data from the Lega Nord’s website, which contains an archive of visual 
propaganda. The individual pieces are coded to determine what the “other” being 
presented is (and if there is an “other” being presented). This data will show how the 
Lega’s perceived “other” has changed over time. The following section will present 
some pieces of visual propaganda from different points in the LN’s history and give an 
in-depth qualitative analysis of how they have changed over time. The chapter will 
conclude with a summarization of findings and their implications. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
It has been argued that for a group to have a unique identity it must have an 
“other” to which its identity is defined as different from (Abizadeh 2005; Johnson and 
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Coleman 2012). The “other” can be defined as, “the intentional construction of a 
region as different from, perhaps even antithetical to, national norms and values as an 
element of nation-building” (Johnson and Coleman 2012). Some have argued that this 
“other” although different, need not be adversarial (Abizadeh 2005). Woods (2011) 
conducted a visual analysis of the Lega Nord’s propaganda which showed that this was 
not the case. The visual propaganda of the Lega Nord embodies an “us against them” 
mentality in relation to the “other” (Woods 2011). 
Based on the theory of “othering”, I hypothesized in Chapter IV that when the 
Lega Nord has identified the “other” as an “other” inside of Italy they will have more 
radical spatial demands, while in periods where the Lega Nord has identified an “other” 
outside of the state its spatial demands would be more moderate. The internal “others” 
that will be examined in this chapter are Southern Italy, and the corrupt Roman political 
elite. The external “others” that will be examined are the European Union, immigrants, 
and globalizing forces. This is not to say that I believe that the LN will shed their 
Northern identity for that of a radical right wing party, but that external others will be 
given more consideration. 
The hypothesis will be tested with quantitative and qualitative data. The 
following section will examine quantitative data coded from the Lega Nord’s visual 
propaganda archive posted on its website
21
. This archive contains propaganda organized 
by date from 2000 to 2014. The posters have been coded to identify the “other” that is 
being presented by the LN. The internal “others” are divided into Southern Italy and the 
                                                          
21
 Source: http://www.leganord.org/index.php/il-movimento/la-nostra-
storia/manifesti?showall=&limitstart= Date accessed: 09/04/2014 
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centralized Italian State (Rome). The external others are divided into the EU and 
immigrants. This dataset systematically show if and how the Lega Nord’s perception of 
the “other” has changed over time. 
The section after will analyze select posters over various time periods 
qualitatively. I will show how the language and images on the poster define the Lega 
Nord’s identity. Comparing visual propaganda quantitatively will show how the LN’s 
conception of the “other” has changed over time. Although this approach is less 
systematic than the quantitative approach, it will allow the analysis to go further back 
than the archive has data for. This approach also allows the analysis to disregard 
propaganda solely political advertising that does not contain any “other”. 
Quantitative Analysis 
Table 5 presents the results of the coding of the visual propaganda from the 
archives of the Lega Nord’s website from a period of 2000-2014. It shows the number 
of posters mentioning a specific “other”, and the percentage of mentions of internal and 
external others by year. The internal others are Rome and the South. Propaganda coded 
with a Roman “other” is that which suggested that politicians were thieving or 
untrustworthy, or attacked the Italian state or its programs. Anything containing 
mentions of northern superiority, or disparaging the south or specific southern region 
was coded as having southern “other”. Propaganda that portrayed immigration (legal or 
illegal), or foreigners inside of Italy as negative was coded as having an immigrant 
“other”. Posters advocating for insulation from internationalism, or advocating for 
protectionist economic policies were coded the “other” as the global system. For 
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anything that portrayed the EU, the EMU, or its policies as negative the EU was coded 
as the “other”. 
 Table 5: Frequency of Internal and External Others in the LN’s Visual Propaganda22 
The data supports the hypothesis that the Lega Nord tends to prioritize their 
classification of the “other” externally over the period of 2000-2006. In some cases 
external “othering” is actually more frequent than internal “othering”. Table 5 shows 
this to be the case between the years of 2000 and 2002. This is interesting as the LN 
founded its identity on the basis of “othering” Rome and the South. The hypothesis 
                                                          
22
 Visual propaganda accessible at: http://www.leganord.org/index.php/il-movimento/la-nostra-
storia/manifesti Date accessed: 09/04/2014 
Year Rome South Internal Immigrants EU Globalization External 
2000 1 0 25% 1 2 0 75% 
2001 0 1 20% 3 0 1 80% 
2002 0 2 25% 3 2 1 75% 
2003 4 4 50% 3 1 4 50% 
2004 6 1 63.6% 4 0 0 36.4% 
2005 4 0 66.7% 1 0 1 33.3% 
2006 6 0 60% 3 0 1 40% 
2007 10 0 100% 0 0 0 0% 
2008 8 1 64.3% 5 0 0 35.7% 
2009 1 0 25% 2 0 1 75% 
2010 1 0 100% 0 0 0 0% 
2011 1 0 20% 2 1 1 80% 
2012 3 0 75% 1 0 0 25% 
2013/2014 1 0 16.7% 2 3 0 83.3% 
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would suggest also that this is to be expected. In the period 2001-2006 the Lega Nord 
was advocating for devolution of power to the regions, the most moderate spatial 
demands they have had in their history (Cento Bull 2011). 
However, the data from the rest of the table does not seem to support the 
hypothesis. In 2007 external “othering” dropped to 0%. This may be due to the fact that 
they were out of government for the entirety of this year. In fact, much of the 
propaganda during this year was aimed specifically at Romano Prodi, the Prime Minster 
of a government the Lega was in opposition to. Rather than an “othering” of Rome this 
may have just been political attacks advertisements. This refocusing may have been 
more of an electoral strategy more than anything else. 
This does not explain for the rest of the later dates, especially in 2014. Based on 
the hypothesis one could expect that in a period of secessionist demands there would be 
little mention of external “others”. However, 83.3% of the “othering” taking place is 
external, and much of it focused on the EU. This might be due to the change in 
leadership that occurred in December of 2013 from Roberto Maroni to Matteo Salvini. 
During Salvini’s leadership the Lega Nord website has displayed advertisements for 
Salvini’s Basta Euro tour.  This seems consistent with the new secessionist strategy that 
Salvini has implemented. Along with calls for secession, Salvini has viciously criticized 
the EU and declared the Euro “a crime against humanity” (Agence France Presse 2013). 
He has begun to create a coalition in the European parliament in order to create a 
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“different Europe” (Agence France Presse 2014). This is consistent with the slogan of 
the Basta Euro tour, “Another Europe Is Possible”23.  
Salvini is taking a pan-European approach to secessionism, one that requires the 
allies of other secessionist movements and radical right wing parties in Europe. Salvini 
publicly supports the secession of Scotland and Catalonia, and a Europe with less power 
concentrated in the EU and the states and more with the regions (Agence France Presse 
2014). In the EP, the Lega Nord has entered a political alliance with several other 
Euroskeptic parties led Marine Le Pen and the National Front party of France (Dahlburg 
2014). In an interview posted on the LN’s website and YouTube channel entitled 
“Salvini with Le Pen Together Against a Europe That We Broke”24 Salvini objects 
European immigration and economic policy, stating the need to protect Italian and 
French markets from foreign goods. 
The quantitative analysis disproved my hypothesis that the Lega Nord’s spatial 
demands would be more radical when the “other” was conceptualized as internal than 
when it is conceptualized as external. However, this does not necessarily mean that 
“othering” has no relation to spatial demands. The “other” that the party conceptualizes 
may be impacted by the identified spatial demands and strategies to achieve those 
demands of the party. This conclusion should not be hastily reached, though. This 
would be an interesting topic for future research, as time progresses and more 
information become available about the strategies for “othering” Matteo Salvini will 
employ. 
                                                          
23
 “Un’altra Europa è  possibile” Source: http://www.bastaeuro.org/ Date accessed: 09/02/2014 
24
 Source: “Salvini Con Le Pen Insieme Contro Europa Che Ci Ha Rotto” < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IsaIaPtJZ4Q> Date accessed: 09/04/2014 
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Qualitative Analysis 
Unfortunately the Lega Nord’s online archive does not contain visual 
propaganda from before 2000. For this reason, a systematic quantitative analysis would 
be inappropriate to observe how the LN has changed its perception of the “other” over 
its entire history. However, Davide Caparini, a Lega Nord politician, has an extensive 
archive of Lega Nord propaganda from its earlier years
25
. This archive does not 
organize the posters chronologically or give them all dates, as the Lega Nord’s website 
does. Therefore, I cannot code these by year and add them to the previous chapter’s 
analysis. However, this archive creates the opportunity to conduct a qualitative analysis 
by selecting specific posters from different time periods to give both a visual and 
contextualized understanding about how the perception of the “other” has changed over 
the course of its history, and how it has coincided with its spatial demands.  
 
Figure 3: 1991 Advertisement for the 1
st
 Congress of the Lega Nord 
                                                          
25
 Archive accessible at: <http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm” Date accessed: 
09/13/2014 
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Source: < http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm> (Accessed 9/13/2014) 
This first image is promoting the 1
st
 Lega Nord Congress, held on February 8-
10
th, 1991. Visually the “othering” of south and central Italy can be seen in the symbol 
of Il Giramento di Pontida being superimposed over an image of Northern Italy. 
Beneath the logo is the phrase “Reppublica Del Nord” (Republic of the North). It is 
important to note that in 1991 the LN was not campaigning for secession, but 
federalism (Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). In their earlier years the LN campaigned for a 
more radical form of federalism that would create three separate confederal regions 
(Cento Bull and Gilbert 2001). This is indicated on the poster in the phrase “Uno Stato 
Confederale: Nord-Centro-Sud” (One Confederal State: North-Center-South”. This 
poster does more than suggest that the Italian state should be reorganized. The phrase 
“Repubblica Del Nord” suggests that this arrangement will benefit the North 
specifically. This arrangement, proposed by the Lega Nord, for the interests of Republic 
of the North, identifies Southern and Central Italy as the “other”.  
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Figure 4: Lega Nord Poster from the 1
st
 Secession Period 
Source: < http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm> (Accessed 9/13/2014) 
Image 3 is from the period of 1996-1999, after the fall of Berlusconi I, the first 
time the Lega Nord openly campaigned for secession. This poster presents two 
alternatives for the North. The first, in the bright colors of the flag of the EU, the North 
of Northern independence, of European liberalism and production, and of the Lega 
Nord. The alternative, in colored bleak black and white, is the North of master Rome, of 
Fini, Berlusconi, and the Southerners, and of D’Alema and Bianco (politicians of the 
Italian left), big capital, and welfarism. 
The contrast between good and bad is immediately noticeable visually due to the 
contrast of color. Northern independence, European liberalism and production, and the 
Lega Nord appear in bright visually appealing colors. They are in the colors of the EU 
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flag, which suggests a glorification of Pan-Europeanism, which is interesting 
considering the EU will later be identified by the Lega Nord as a political enemy. It was 
during this period that the LN and several other European separatist groups adopted the 
framework of a “Europe of Regions”, which would utilize the EU as a platform to 
increase the power of the regions of Europe versus their respective states (Giordano 
2001; Giordano 2004). The top portion of this poster identifies the North with the Lega 
and with a regional EU. 
The bottom portion, by contrast, is in black and white, making it visually seem 
bleak. The bleak future of the North is characterized as being enslaved to master Rome, 
and the politicians of the South, big capital, and welfarism. Placing the politicians and 
the centralized state in dark colors and describing them in a negative light characterizes 
an internal “other” as politicians and Rome. This poster suggests that the EU and 
Northern secession are ways to rid the North of the Roman “other”. 
Image 4 is an advertisement from 2001 for a Lega Nord immigration rally. It 
reads “Stop! Illegals and Delinquency” had has the word “Basta” (enough) 
superimposed over a picture of two men. One of the men is masked and holding a 
firearm, the other is breaking into something with a crowbar. This poster is meant to 
equate illegal immigration and crime together, thus rendering illegal immigration a 
security issue. The word STOP in all capital letters makes the issue of immigration 
seem urgent as well. The Lega Nord presents immigrants as the “other” in this poster by 
presenting them as a security threat. It is important to note that in 2001 the Lega Nord 
was in its least radical period of spatial demands, calling for devolution (Cento Bull 
2011). Identifying a common external “other” with Forza Italia and the Allienza 
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Nazionale aided the Lega Nord in being able to cooperate within the CdL by calling for 
more moderate spatial demands. This made the coalition much more stable than in 
Berlusconi I. 
 
Figure 5: Advertisement for Lega Nord Immigration Day 
Source: < http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm> (Accessed 9/13/2014) 
Image 5, from 2009, is a photograph of a boat packed with illegal immigrants 
with the phrase “Abbiamo Fermato L’invasione” (We stopped the invasion) over it. 
This poster is a way for the Lega Nord to take credit for their role in creating highly 
restrictive immigration policy. As mentioned in Chapter VII, the LN played an 
instrumental role in the passage of the 2008 Security Package, laws containing extreme 
measures in response to illegal immigration (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011). The 
use of the word “invasion” to describe illegal immigration frames the issue as a security 
threat. The LN tries to portray itself in a heroic light by claiming that it defended 
against this threat. This creates a contrast in the poster by identifying the Lega Nord as 
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heroic defenders against the invasion of the immigrant “others”. It is important to note 
at this time the LN was in coalition with Berlusconi and the PdL, and they were 
campaigning on fiscal federalism (Cento Bull 2011).  
 
Figure 6: “We Stopped the Invasion” 
Source: < http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm> (Accessed 9/13/2014) 
Image 6 is an advertisement for Matteo Salvini’s Basta Euro Tour from May of 
2014. “Basta Euro” (Enough of the Euro) clearly opposes further EU integration, 
specifically in the sector of the EMU. This signifies a shift in the Lega Nord’s 
“othering” to the EU. However, this anti-EU stance does not seem to be the same as the 
anti EU stance taken in the early 2000s under Umberto Bossi. Image 6 reads “Pontida 
Un’Altra Europa è Possibile” (Pontida another Europe is Possible). This “others” the 
EU, but it does not “other” Europe.  
This suggests that the Lega Nord may be reverting back to the logic of the 
“Europe of regions”. The LN had previously used this logic in their secessionist period 
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between 1996 and 1999, and took a pro EU stance (Giordano 2004). After the 
realization that the EU gave little power to the regions, the Lega Nord took a decisively 
anti-European stance (Giordano 2004). The idea of the “Europe of regions seems to be 
arising again in LN ideology, but this Europe of regions does not include the EU, which 
they appear to view as a failed experiment in Pan-Europeanism.  
 
Figure 7: Advertisement for Matteo Salvini’s Basta Euro Tour 
Source: < http://www.caparini.com/propaganda/manifesti%20lega.htm> (Accessed 9/13/2014) 
Conclusions 
The quantitative analysis did not support the hypothesis that that when the Lega 
Nord has identified the “other” as an “other” inside of Italy they will have more radical 
spatial demands, while in periods where the Lega Nord has identified an “other” outside 
of the state its spatial demands would be more moderate. This could have possibly been 
the case under the leadership of Umberto Bossi. However, under the leadership of 
Matteo Salvini this dynamic seemed to change, as he mainly identified external “others” 
in a period of secession. From this data it cannot be concluded that “othering” has a 
direct effect on spatial demands. 
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This does not necessarily mean that spatial demands and “othering” are not 
related. The qualitative analysis supported the idea that an “other” can be used as a tool 
of propaganda to justify changes in territorial demands. The change in the Lega Nord’s 
other when compared to the spatial demands seem to suggest that the inverse is true. 
The spatial demands will have an impact on the “other” as it can be used to justify a 
territorial claim or divert attention from a more radical goal made previously.
 
 
110 
 
 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will make concluding remarks about the results of the analyses of 
this study. The sections will review the relevant hypotheses and whether they were 
confirmed or not by the analysis. This will be followed by a discussion of what can be 
inferred from the data analyses. Finally, the sections will suggest topics for future 
research. The sections will review electoral, economic, and internal factors, and 
“othering” in relation to the Lega Nord’s oscillation between more moderate and more 
radical spatial demands. The final section will make general conclusions about ethno-
regionalist parties and the merits and detriments of applying generalized models of party 
demands to them. 
Electoral Factors 
It was hypothesized in Chapter VI that oscillations in spatial demands of the Lega 
Nord will be adjusted in order to maximize votes. The data from the EEC seemed to 
confirm this. Changes in the LN’s spatial demands tended to occur when they 
experienced an electoral shock, either in the general or European Parliament elections. 
This suggests that the Lega does behave as a vote seeking party, and that their primary 
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goals can be altered for electoral viability. Somer-Topcu (2009) claimed that with 
party change comes an uncertain risk. Electoral information can be a source of 
information that will aid in the party’s decision of whether or not to assume that risk. The 
results of electoral data analysis support this claim. 
In the analysis of electoral factors it was also hypothesized that the Lega Nord 
will oscillate its spatial demands when other parties begin to adopt similar stances on 
issues, specifically in regard to federalism. Though this did appear to be the case when 
comparing Forza Italia’s stances on federalism with the Lega Nord in the 1990s, this was 
not the case after the turn of the century. This does not necessarily imply that there is no 
correlation between the LN’s spatial demands and the positions of other political parties. 
The relationship changed between the Lega and the FI following the EP elections of 
1999, changing from that of political adversaries to political allies. 
The analysis of the data from the Comparative Manifesto Project suggests that 
there is a different dynamic between the policy positions of other parties, and their 
demands when their relationship changes. The Lega Nord seemed to push for more 
radical spatial demands as the FI began to address federalism in the 90s. However, after 
the LN and FI entered into the CdL together they began to converge on the issue of 
federalism. Adams and Somer Topcu (2009) found that parties tend to move in the same 
direction as other parties are shifting within their own ideological family. The analysis of 
the Lega Nord suggests that this is only the case when the two parties within the 
ideological family are on amicable terms. 
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Economic Factors 
Based on the logic that the Lega Nord behaved as a vote seeking party which 
engaged in simulative politics it was hypothesized in Chapter VII that there will be no 
correlation between the openness of the Italian economy and its spatial demands. When 
examining the KOF coefficient of economic openness for Italy, there does not appear to 
be any relation with the LN’s spatial demands. This supports my hypothesis and further 
supports the argument that the Lega Nord behaves as a vote seeking party. 
However, the qualitative analysis of the Lega Nord’s political behavior suggests 
that the inverse is true. The LN’s spatial demands have impacted the party’s ability to 
direct Italian economic policy. If a party does not have adequate coalition potential, then 
it will not form a coalition, and thus they will not be able to effect policy from inside the 
government (Sartori 1976). In periods when the Lega Nord had more radical spatial 
demands, it had less coalition potential because FI and the AN were in support of the 
preservation of the territorial boundaries of the Italian state. However, when the LN 
moderated its spatial demands it was able to gain prominent positions inside governing 
coalitions and was better equipped to implement its economic agenda. This was most 
clearly manifested in the Lega Nord’s role in creating protectionist legislation in the areas 
of foreign labor and immigration. 
Internal Factors 
Based on the logic of the Lega Nord being a personalist party, it was hypothesized 
in Chapter VIII that the individual level actions of Umberto Bossi would be a relevant 
factor regarding the change in the LN’s spatial demands. This hypothesis was supported 
from a historical qualitative analysis of how Umberto Bossi’s personal decisions and 
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relationships related with various periods of spatial demands. For most of the Lega 
Nord’s history there has been no change in leadership, dominant party faction, or internal 
power structure. This provides a unique opportunity to conduct an individual level 
analysis of Umberto Bossi while controlling for these previously identified internal 
factors. This study finds that changes originating in the party leader can have an impact 
on spatial demands, even if there is no change in the leadership itself. 
The Lega Nord was able to quickly make shifts between federalism and secession 
because of the personal relationship formed between Umberto Bossi and Silvio 
Berlusconi. Many of the party activists opposed electoral pacts with FI at first (Cento 
Bull and Gilbert 2001). However, since Bossi had tight control over the party he was able 
to ignore these activists and make decisions that he thought to be prudent and electorally 
viable for the LN. Historically, the concentration of power in the Lega Nord have made 
the individual level actions of its leader an important factor that has impacted its spatial 
demands. 
Based on previous theories, this study hypothesized that change in the party 
leadership has an impact on changes in the Lega Nord’s spatial demands. This hypothesis 
seemed to be confirmed through a qualitative analysis. Under the leadership of Matteo 
Salvini, the LN is once again on the path of secessionism. The qualitative analysis also 
revealed that this is not only a switch in spatial demands, but a switch in strategy to 
achieve these demands as well. Bossi had focused on the secession of Padania primarily 
as an internal affair in Italy. Salvini has made efforts for regional empowerment at the EU 
level and has become involved in many secessionist and irredentist movements across 
Europe. 
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 “Othering” 
In the previous chapter the impact of “othering” was examined in relation to 
spatial demands. It was hypothesized that when the Lega Nord has identified the “other” 
as an “other” inside of Italy they will have more radical spatial demands, while in periods 
where the Lega Nord has identified an “other” outside of the state its spatial demands 
would be more moderate. The quantitative analysis of visual propaganda did not support 
this hypothesis. However, the qualitative analysis of posters did shed some insight onto 
this relationship. The change in the “other” that the Lega Nord defines may not be a 
result of the change in their spatial demands, but may be used as a tool for the 
justification of their spatial demands. Examining how “othering” is used as a justification 
for spatial demands would be an interesting topic for future research on other ethno-
regionalist parties. 
Conclusion 
The recent referendum for Scottish independence is a reminder that ethno-
regionalism is still a powerful political force in Europe. Recent trends, both at the state 
and EU level warrant the need for further understanding of how ethno-regionalist parties 
function. This study has identified factors that relate to the spatial demands of ethno-
regionalist parties. There are many studies relating to party demands in general, but few 
that look at the idiosyncrasies of ethno-regionalist parties. 
Some of the analyses of this study, specifically those regarding electoral and 
economic factors, have shown that the generalized models of party demands do not 
necessarily fit ethno-regionalist parties. Smaller scale studies of ethno-regionalism could 
offer more insight onto how these parties are abnormal in some respects. Chapter VIII 
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demonstrated that previous studies overlooked actions at of individual leaders. This is a 
level of analysis frequently overlooked in large N quantitative studies. Both the analysis 
of internal factors and “othering” were able to give deep contextual insight into how these 
mechanisms were related to the oscillation of spatial demands. Ethno-regionalist parties 
are a specific sub-category of political party. Therefore, to truly understand how these 
parties function, more contextualized studies would be appropriate.
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